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Conflicts over “sanctuary” cities, minimum wage laws, and genderneutral bathrooms have brought the problematic landscape of contemporary
state preemption of local governance to national attention. This Article
contends that more covert, although equally robust, state interference can
be found in property, with signiﬁcant consequences for our understanding of takings law.
Takings jurisprudence looks to the states to mediate most tensions
between individual property rights and community needs, as the takings
federalism literature recognizes. Takings challenges, however, often involve
local governments. If the doctrine privileges the democratic process to
resolve most takings claims, then, that critical process is a largely local one.
Despite the centrality of local democracy to takings, state legislatures
have restricted local authority on property issues in a range of ways.
States have expanded compensatory liability for owners facing local
regulations, imposed procedural constraints on local authority, and
limited the exercise of foundational local powers. Seen in its entirety, this
state intervention—like contemporary “new preemption”—is acontextual
and unduly rigid, cutting at the heart of the devolutionary principles
underlying takings jurisprudence.
This unbalanced state role requires a recalibration of decisionmaking
power between state and local government to foster intersystemic dialogue
and reﬂection. States certainly play a crucial role in deﬁning and protecting property interests, but they must justify choices to constrain local
discretion when state and local values conﬂict. The extant state statutory
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regime dispenses with this justiﬁcatory task via a formalistic disregard
for the contextualization that legitimates vertical allocations of authority.
A corrective to decades of imbalance in state ordering of local authority
would thus properly recognize “takings localism.”
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INTRODUCTION
Takings jurisprudence deﬁnes when just compensation to those
impacted by changes in property law is constitutionally required.1 The case
law, by and large, leaves many challenging questions of the balance
between individual property rights and community imperatives to be
resolved through the democratic process within the states. This doctrinal
reality has generated a growing debate on takings federalism. Some
scholars decry the lack of national uniformity and the seeming absence of
robust protection for property that this devolution entails.2 Others, by
contrast, underscore the value of evaluating property transitions with
greater regard for the states’ traditional centrality in deﬁning property
interests.3
This debate obscures the fact that the conﬂicts that give rise to takings
claims far more often than not are local in nature.4 Indeed, many iconic
takings cases involve local governments.5 This is true in discerning the
boundaries of public use for eminent domain,6 in evaluating the
1. The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution states: “[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, What’s Federalism Got to Do with Regulatory
Takings?, 8 Brigham-Kanner Prop. Rts. Conf. J. 9, 9–14 (2019) [hereinafter Berger, What’s
Federalism] (arguing for a “system of uniformly applied standards” to ensure a “federal
baseline of constitutional protection” from state and local regulations restricting the uses of
property); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. Chi. Legal Forum 53, 71–
76 [hereinafter Somin, Federalism and Property Rights] (arguing that “rational political
ignorance and irrationality” inﬂuence local land-use policy by reducing the quality of
government decisionmaking and the ability to monitor abuses).
3. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L.J. 203, 205–06 (2004) [hereinafter Sterk, Federalist Dimension]
(positing that the Supreme Court need not use its takings jurisprudence to articulate a
comprehensive theory of regulatory power because any constitutional takings standard must
incorporate the background principles of each individual state’s property laws).
4. See infra section I.B.
5. Notable takings cases have certainly involved the states. See, e.g., Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 709–11 (2010) (Florida beach
restoration program); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 533 (2005) (Hawaii
commercial rent control); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–15 (2001) (Rhode
Island Coastal Resources Management Council decision); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1007–09 (1992) (South Carolina Coastal Council decision); Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1922) (Pennsylvania statute). For additional cases, see infra
note 69. The federal government generates its share of cases that shape takings doctrine as
well. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 516–19 (2013) (USDA raisin
program); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 26–28 (2012) (federal
ﬂood control); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3–7 (1984)
(condemnation for a national preserve); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41 (1960)
(federal contracting). But in the sweep of takings jurisprudence, local governments have
consistently been front and center. See infra section I.B.
6. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005) (eminent
domain for local economic development); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–30 (1954)
(eminent domain for urban renewal).
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constitutional limits of exactions,7 and across the heartland of regulatory
takings.8 And data on takings cases in the lower courts underscore the
centrality of local governments to takings jurisprudence.9
Although local democracy stands at the center of takings jurisprudence, state legislatures have played a remarkably active role in structuring
local power over property. This state legislative oversight has come in a
variety of forms. Some state statutes make it easier for owners to obtain
compensation when they face local regulations, by lowering the liability
threshold below what case law sets or by limiting governmental defenses
in takings cases.10 Other state statutes impose signiﬁcant procedural
burdens on local governments, such as takings impact assessment
requirements and individualized negotiation mandates, designed to
discourage the adoption of local regulations.11 Still other statutes constrain
outright speciﬁc local-government powers in the realms of eminent
domain, tenant protections, environmental preservation, and beyond.12 A
fourth category of statutes empowers owners to resist the exercise of local
government authority in areas such as historic preservation and land-use
permitting.13
Assessments of property rights statutes have long been a staple of the
literature.14 Scholars, however, have not framed the full range and depth
7. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–80 (1994) (local government
ﬂood prevention and transportation schemes). The term “exactions” describes “certain
conditions that are attached to land-use permits issued at the government’s discretion”
that “ostensibly oblige property owners to internalize the costs of the expected
infrastructural, environmental, and social harms resulting from development.” Timothy
M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 137,
137–38 (2016).
8. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–38 (1978) (setting
the modern framework for regulatory takings in a case challenging New York City’s historic
preservation law). And, of course, the leading case on deﬁning the relevant parcel for
regulatory takings is a local government case. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939–
40 (2017) (county-level lot-merger rules).
9. See generally James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit
Takings, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 35 (2016) (analyzing all lower court takings decisions
between 1978 and 2012 and ﬁnding that the overwhelming majority involved local
governments). For additional detail, see infra note 108.
10. See infra section II.A.
11. See infra section II.B.
12. See infra section II.C.
13. See infra section II.D.
14. On compensation statutes, see, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the
Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 Ecology L.Q. 187, 212–20 (1997)
(examining Texas and Florida compensation statutes); John D. Echeverria & Thekla
Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons from Democracy’s
Laboratories, 28 Stan. Env’t L.J. 439, 447–99 (2009) (discussing Florida and Oregon
property rights legislation); Robert H. Freilich & RoxAnne Doyle, Takings Legislation:
Misguided and Dangerous, 46 Land Use L. & Zoning Dig. 3, 3–4 (1994) (discussing
opposition to takings legislation, including criticism of its potential ﬁscal impact and
bureaucratic costs); Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a
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of this state ordering of local authority in core areas of takings
jurisprudence as a fundamental question of state–local relations.15
Understanding property rights statutes as state preemption highlights the
connection between this state legislation and the rise of a broad and
contentious contemporary wave of state intervention that is similarly
sweeping.16
Response to “Environmental Takings”, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 613, 635–38 (1995) (discussing how
compensation bills are a form of property rights protection); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings
Bills Threaten Private Property, People, and the Environment, 8 Fordham Env’t L.J. 521,
567–87 (1997) (arguing that compensation bills would harm property rights by
undermining “environmental, conservation and other laws that prevent harms to . . . private
property, health, and natural resources”). On eminent domain reform, see, e.g., James W.
Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 127,
133–48 (2009) (reviewing states’ legislative and judicial efforts to reform eminent domain);
Harvey M. Jacobs & Ellen M. Bassett, All Sound, No Fury? The Impacts of State-Based Kelo
Laws, 63 Plan. & Env’t L. 3, 6–8 (2011) (outlining the impact of eminent domain reform
legislation on land-use planning); Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of
State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 Ecology L.Q. 703, 726–
27 (2011) (summarizing general trends in legislation relating to eminent domain); Andrew
P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo, 17
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 237, 270–76 (2009) (examining various reasons why states adopted
eminent domain reform legislation through regression analysis); Ilya Somin, The Limits of
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100, 2114 (2009)
[hereinafter Somin, Political Response to Kelo] (challenging the claim that the state
legislation enacted to limit the power of eminent domain in Kelo’s immediate wake largely
serves the same end as a judicial bar on the use of eminent domain for economic
development purposes).
15. Some scholars, to be sure, have fruitfully differentiated between states and local
governments in takings law. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About
Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1681, 1693–701 (2007) [Rose, What Federalism
Tells Us] (criticizing takings doctrine for failing to account for the distinct competencies of
the various levels of government); Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small
Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1624, 1680–85
(2006) [hereinafter Serkin, Big Differences] (proposing a reduction in takings
compensation awards leveled against local governments to account for their general risk
aversion on ﬁscal issues); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of
Property Protection, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 883, 905–08 (2007) [hereinafter Serkin, Local
Property] (proposing that local governments generally should be allowed to determine the
level of property protection they want to afford within their boundaries); see also William
A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Inﬂuence Local Government
Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 4–5 (2005) [hereinafter Fischel,
Homevoter Hypothesis] (contending that, given the incentives that arise from the
concentration of investments in their homes, homeowners have more inﬂuence on the
efficiency of local governments than they do on that of state or federal governments);
William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 328–29 (1995)
(arguing that local governments are more responsive to ﬁscal pressures than higher levels
of government, and therefore, efficiency is best served by subjecting local governments to a
more stringent level of takings scrutiny than their state and federal counterparts). This
literature, however, has not focused on the broad ways in which property rights statutes have
reordered the vertical allocation of authority within the states.
16. The literature on takings federalism attends as well to the horizontal distribution
of decisionmaking power within the judiciary. Indeed, discerning which court system should
resolve takings cases—a question that implicates the relative competency and theoretical
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Over the past decade, state preemption of local authority has
morphed from its traditional focus on justiﬁably advancing state regulatory
standards and policing signiﬁcant interlocal conﬂicts as speciﬁc contexts
dictate, to the alarm of many state and local government legal scholars.17
Today, states often do little to justify preemption that has become
increasingly expansive, targeted, polarized, and even punitive. Examples
of what Professor Richard Briffault has labeled the “new preemption”18
range across almost every area of local authority, from employee protections to public health to housing to civil rights.19 This has amounted to
a fundamental reordering of the state–local legal relationship, generating
calls for reform to protect against instances where states are unjustiﬁably
undermining local democracy.20
The new preemption and burgeoning responses to concerns with
unjustiﬁed state interference are instructive for evaluating state constraints

comparable costs and beneﬁts of state or federal venues for the resolution of constitutionalproperty questions, as well as the relationship between courts and states—has long been the
primary focus of the discourse. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Not Just a Procedural Case: The
Substantive Implications of Knick for State Property Law and Federal Takings Doctrine, 47
Fordham Urb. L.J. 591, 593 (2020) [hereinafter Dana, Implications of Knick] (observing
that the Supreme Court’s recent overturning of Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), in Knick v. Township
of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), may be an “impediment to the productive adaption of state
property law to . . . climate change”); Daniel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably Never See a
Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 459, 459–62, 465–67 (2010) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is unlikely to create a judicial takings doctrine because doing so would
ignore state sovereignty and disregard common law). This vein of the literature, again, does
not focus on the vertical distribution of decisionmaking power over takings within the states.
17. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stan. L. Rev.
1995, 1999–2008, 2017–25 (2018) [hereinafter Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption]
(analyzing the spread of a new, more punitive form of state preemption of local government
action and legal doctrines available to challenge it); Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 Yale L.J. 954, 984–1000 (2019) [hereinafter
Davidson, Dilemma of Localism] (advocating, in the pursuit of equity, for a greater focus
on the normative dimensions of localism); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A
Reordering of the State–Local Relationship?, 106 Geo. L.J. 1469, 1504–07 (2018) (arguing
that “hyper preemption” statutes undermine local government action more than traditional
preemption statutes); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 Tex. L. Rev.
1163, 1184–88 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, The Attack on American Cities] (asserting
that current state–city conﬂicts represent a larger trend of state aggrandizement and
hostility toward local power).
18. Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 1997 (deﬁning new
preemption as “sweeping state laws that clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times
punitively bar local efforts to address a host of local problems”).
19. See generally Richard Briffault, Nestor M. Davidson & Laurie Reynolds, The New
Preemption Reader: Legislation, Cases, and Commentary on the Leading Challenge
in Today’s State and Local Government Law (2019) (collecting statutes, cases, and
commentary on the new preemption).
20. See infra section III.A.
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on local authority in the areas of property law most germane to takings.21
Takings jurisprudence guides changes in property law in ways that
maintain property’s character as a healthy, fair, and just democratic
institution. The formalist rigidity and undue uniformity imposed by state
preemption make it difficult for takings law to serve this vital role. The
current allocation of authority within the states, in short, fails to honor the
deference and respect for local democracy so evident within the core of
takings jurisprudence.22
In the face of this imbalance, this Article proposes a context-sensitive
framework for rebalancing the vertical distribution of decisionmaking
power within the states. Local governments are where the costs and
beneﬁts of property regulation are felt most immediately, making the local
democratic process particularly apt for evaluating tradeoffs at the heart of
takings law; moreover, local governments are well suited to respond to
local preferences and innovate in the face of changing conditions.23 At the
same time, local governments can be parochial and exclusionary, and the
immobility of property creates special vulnerabilities for owners in the
local political economy. State interventions more directly targeted at those
speciﬁc pathologies, however, may be preferable to approaches that
broadly undermine important aspects of local democracy.24
Highlighting these and related characteristics of local governments is
not to advocate, in some dispositive and general fashion, the preeminence
of local decisionmaking over the states on the myriad property issues that
animate takings law. Rather, these characteristics demonstrate the value of
a more contextualized analysis that the rigid takings-related state statutes
largely preclude.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the dynamics of federalism at the heart of contemporary takings jurisprudence and the underappreciated centrality of local governance within those dynamics. Part II
turns to cataloguing the many ways that state legislatures have structured
local authority in constitutional property—a comprehensive analysis of
property rights legislation as state preemption absent in the current
literature. Finally, Part III links this state ordering of local authority to the
rise of new preemption and normative concerns the phenomenon has
21. This Article focuses on the Takings Clause, but it bears acknowledging that
constitutional property also involves claims arising under the Due Process Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, and other federal and state constitutional provisions.
22. Takings is not the only mechanism within property law that strikes a balance
between individual rights and community needs, of course. It is, however, a particularly
salient and critical proving ground for that balance, with inﬂuence in property discourse
that merits sustained focus.
23. See infra section III.B.
24. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 976–78 (reviewing normative
and pragmatic critiques of local authority); see also David Schleicher, Constitutional Law
for NIMBYs: A Review of “Principles of Home Rule for the 21st Century” by the National
League of Cities, 81 Ohio St. L.J. 883, 903–05 (2020) (critiquing a recent reform proposal
for enhancing local authority).
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engendered in the discourse on state and local government law. This
Article accordingly concludes with a call for a recalibration that would give
greater recognition—again, within the wide margins set by the jurisprudence—to the important role that local governance plays in takings
law. This “takings localism” has the potential to deepen our understanding
of the intersection between local authority and the construction of constitutional property at a moment when the most fundamental questions
about that intersection are increasingly fraught.
I. FEDERALISM AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TAKINGS
The protections afforded by the Takings Clause are inextricably
bound up with the fact that states in our legal system deﬁne the boundaries
of many important property interests. While other federal constitutional
rights, such as those protected by the Contracts Clause, interact with stategrounded aspects of common law doctrine, the deﬁnitional power of the
states in the realm of property creates a particularly sharp dilemma: If
states can define property, what baseline should courts use to determine
whether there has been a change in property law requiring compensation?25
This state role risks undermining takings protections by ceding
deﬁnitional authority to the states—what Justice Kennedy once described
as placing a “Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”26 Despite that
risk, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed state authority in
takings, reﬂecting the highly contextual nature of the balance between
individual rights and community imperatives in constitutional property.
Thus, although demarcating some broad outer constitutional boundaries,
the Court has seemed generally content to respond to Justice Holmes’s
Zen-koan-like query—when does a regulation go “too far?”27—with a
25. As a doctrinal matter, the precise interplay between state law and constitutional
protection for property rights continues to vex the courts. As Professor Thomas Merrill has
noted, property for constitutional purposes could be understood as a purely state-deﬁned
concept (whether in positivist terms or as natural-law inﬂected), as having independent
federal constitutional meaning, or as a federal–state hybrid—what he has described as a
“patterning” deﬁnition. See Thomas W. Merrill, Choice of Law in Takings Cases, 8 BrighamKanner Prop. Rts. Conf. J. 45, 46–51 (2019) (identifying federal constitutional law and state
law as sources of law in takings cases and advocating for “federal-patterning” as “a federal
constitutional articulation of how the question should broadly be resolved, leaving the
speciﬁc details to be ﬁlled in as a matter of state law”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape
of Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885, 893, 942–54 (2000) (rejecting both “natural
property” and “pure positivist” deﬁnitions of property and instead promoting a “patterning
deﬁnition”). The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this debate in Murr v. Wisconsin
can be read as endorsing a federal approach to the deﬁnition of property for purposes of
the Takings Clause, albeit an approach explicitly inﬂuenced by state doctrine. See 137 S. Ct.
1933, 1945 (2017) (listing as among the factors courts should consider in delineating a
parcel “the treatment of the land under state and local law”). Murr, though, will hardly be
the last word on this interplay.
26. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
27. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating that “if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking”).
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political-procedural answer: generally, where the public, through the
democratic process within the states, has drawn the line.28 Section I.A
elaborates on this federalist dimension of takings and the debate it has
spawned in the literature.
That most of the types of property disputes that have found their way
to the center of takings law are resolved through the states’ political
processes, however, raises a less appreciated question of the allocation of
power within the states. As section I.B explains, a notably broad swath of
major takings cases have involved local governments. The deference the
Supreme Court has shown to the democratic process in takings federalism
thus raises critical vertical allocation-of-power questions that do not stop
at the federal–state boundary.
A.

Understanding Takings Federalism

The entire panoply of takings doctrine—not just regulatory takings,
but related questions about the scope of eminent domain and the
procedures that govern in takings cases—has long been decried as a
muddle.29 In practice, though, some basic patterns have emerged in the
jurisprudence.30 Cases involving the direct exercise of eminent domain
tend to hinge on technical issues, like questions of valuation,31 though
there are some challenging outer-margin issues when the power is
exercised for policies like economic development.32 Regulatory takings
claims, in turn, are either channeled into the small handful of nominally
“per se” categories that generate very few actual cases,33 or, in the
28. As Professors James Krier and Stewart Sterk have succinctly noted, “[b]y and large,
political processes, not judicial doctrine, . . . serve as the primary check on government
activity” in the takings context. Krier & Sterk, supra note 9, at 35.
29. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom
Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 826, 883 (2006);
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 561, 561 (1984).
30. On the emergence of patterns through the application of context-sensitive
standards, see, for example, Timothy M. Mulvaney, Walling Out: Rules and Standards in the
Beach Access Context, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 123–24) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property
Law, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1369, 1402–05 (2013).
31. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value, Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 682–704 (2005) (noting that “[c]ourts . . . are
much more likely to discuss compensation in the context of eminent domain proceedings”
than in the context of regulatory takings challenges).
32. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–80 (2005) (considering
the meaning of “public use”).
33. These categories include regulations that deny an owner “all economically
beneﬁcial or productive use of land,” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(1992), and regulations that create a permanent physical occupation of property, see
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–40 (1982). These
categories only nominally create “per se” regulatory takings liability because embedded in
them are threshold questions, such as determining how permanent is “permanent.” See,
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overwhelming majority of cases, resolved through the open-textured
framework laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.34
And while the Court is still grappling with the boundaries of “exactions”—
a peculiar species of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that is based
on underlying takings claims35—the doctrinal contours of what has come
to be known as exaction takings law have been in place for decades.36
Despite this relative stability, courts have not, at least in any strict
sense, endorsed a single, overarching theoretical theme to justify this
doctrinal landscape. Rather, they have all but engraved an invitation to
scholars to advance competing normative and pragmatic conceptions of
constitutional property protection. One prominent way of understanding
the purpose and function of the Takings Clause, then, foregrounds the
incentives that a constitutional compensation mandate provides for both
governmental actors and owners. In this view, takings law polices against
what scholars call ﬁscal illusion: the risk that public decisionmaking will be
“mispriced” if government officials can act without internalizing the costs
of their actions.37 Similarly, scholars in this efficiency-oriented vein have
e.g., id. at 428. There are also additional qualifications. The state, for example, may eliminate
all economic value without compensation if the relevant prohibition was embodied in
background principles of state law. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. On the paucity of cases
that involve the Supreme Court’s categorical rules, see Krier & Sterk, supra note 9, at 55–62.
34. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
35. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013) (exaction takings
case); see also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (noting the ongoing uncertainty about whether
administrative exactions should be evaluated differently than legislative exactions).
36. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (establishing that, under the
Takings Clause, a condition attached to a development permit must exhibit “rough
proportionality” to the approved development’s anticipated impacts); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (establishing that, under the Takings Clause, there must
be an “essential nexus” between a condition attached to a development and the approved
development’s anticipated impacts).
37. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 569, 620–22 (1984) (explaining that “[f]iscal illusion arises
because the costs of governmental actions are generally discounted by the decisionmaking
body,” and that compensation can “serve as a corrective device” for this “governmental
failure”). This rationale for compensation has been the subject of sustained criticism. See,
e.g., Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1, 16–37 (2016) [hereinafter Berger, The Illusion] (arguing that the ﬁscal-illusion
hypothesis ignores governmental incentives to manage land use to maximize revenue
through property taxation, and thus a compensation mandate undermines regulatory socialcost internalization); Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government
Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement
on Eminent-Domain Exercises, 45 J. Legal Stud. 437, 457–63 (2016) (offering an empirical
analysis that calls into question the centrality of the ﬁscal-illusion argument for mandating
compensation); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 363–67 (2000) (arguing that
political actors generally respond to political, not ﬁscal, incentives and that while the
compensation mandate may deter some inefficient regulations, ﬁscal incentives generally
will not systematically prevent inefficiency). Nevertheless, the ﬁscal-illusion rationale
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argued that calibrating compensation properly is necessary to prevent
moral hazard for owners, who might be inclined to overinvest in property
in the presence of supramarket compensation.38
The Supreme Court itself has often, if not entirely consistently, been
less concerned explicitly with public and private incentives and more
focused on a different normative vision and operative principle. In
Armstrong v. United States, the Supreme Court famously stated that the
Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”39 This concern with the allocation of the
burdens of regulatory change echoes across many aspects of the jurisprudence,40 and scholars have elaborated its implications in some detail.41
remains prominent in takings dialogue. See Christopher Serkin, Response, The Fiscal
Illusion Zombie: The Undead Theory of Government Regulatory Incentives, 66 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1433, 1457 (2017) (“[F]iscal illusion relies upon an implausible, even bizarre,
assumption . . . [but] it continues to be invoked as a justiﬁcation for expansive takings
protection.”).
38. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 29,
35–38 (2003) (arguing for a “contributory negligence” rule in which property owners would
not be compensated if they were to “overdevelop” their property).
A signiﬁcant literature elaborates on takings as a means of optimizing the efficiency of
regulatory transitions. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,
99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 615–17 (1986) (arguing that relying on market forces to determine
the effect of government action is more efficient than transitional relief by the government);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Response, Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to
Professor Dagan, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 157, 167 (2000) (noting that takings compensation can
create inefficiencies where short-term ﬁscal constraints prevent the government from
proceeding with regulations that offer long-term beneﬁts on net); Carol M. Rose, Property
and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 1, 18–21
(describing regulatory takings law as serving to mediate regulatory transitions).
39. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
40. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012)
(describing the Armstrong principle as a guidepost that is “fundamental in . . . Takings
Clause jurisprudence”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24
(1978) (“[T]his court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.” (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594 (1961))).
41. The literature on the role of fairness and justice—in distributional and other moral
valences—of takings law is voluminous to say the least. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings
and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741, 743 (1999) (offering a “doctrine that
distinguishes a regulation from a taking with a view to both civic virtues and egalitarian
concerns”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1172 (1967) (arguing that
“the attempt to formulate rules of decision for compensability cases has, with suggestive
consistency, yielded rules which are ethically unsatisfying”); Andrea L. Peterson, The
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—Takings as Intentional
Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justiﬁcation, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 53, 162 (1990) (“The
Justices appear to be following the intuition that fairness does not require that
compensation be paid if the government is simply stopping the claimant from doing

226

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:215

The Armstrong principle, however, for all of its visceral appeal, hardly
provides determinant jurisprudential answers in all cases, and the Supreme
Court seems to have little interest in offering a clearer resolution.42
Approaching the jurisprudence and underlying conceptual tensions
through a different lens, other scholars have tried to make sense of takings
in institutional terms. Political-process theories of takings are ubiquitous,43
and one relatively common element of those theories focuses on the
allocation of decisional power. A particularly trenchant institutionalist
approach emphasizes the relationship between federal constitutional
doctrine and the states, in what Professor Stewart Sterk has labeled the
“federalist dimension” of constitutional property.44

something wrong . . . .”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 61–
76 (1964) (advancing a framework that “should determine the issue of compensation” in
takings cases); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149,
155 (1971) [hereinafter Sax, Private Property and Public Rights] (“An important question
is whether these [broadly felt] costs should be allowed to remain where they fall, or whether
instead the interests which are diffusely held should be recognized and advanced in the
form of ‘public rights.’”); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of
Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 309, 328–38
(2006) [hereinafter Singer, The Ownership Society] (arguing that a property model
focusing on citizens’ obligations and rights can help clarify takings jurisprudence).
42. It bears acknowledging, however, that the Supreme Court may be on the cusp of a
shift in its Takings Clause jurisprudence as a matter of the realpolitik of the current
alignment of Justices. In the years before his retirement in 2018, Justice Kennedy supplied
the deciding vote in several closely contested constitutional property cases, much as he did
in other contentious areas of law. See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2017)
(Kennedy, J.). Justice Kennedy has now been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh, who, by
indications to date, will take a generally property rights-protective approach to takings cases.
See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Greg Stohr, Kavanaugh Key Vote as Justices Overturn
Property Rights Case (2), Bloomberg L. (June 21, 2019), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/kavanaugh-key-vote-as-justices-overturn-property-precedent
[https://perma.cc/F6HV-NE94] (noting that Justice Kavanaugh was likely the deciding
vote in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), a decision that overturned a
decades-old precedent that had been seen as limiting property rights). As the Supreme
Court’s recently constituted conservative majority does not seem particularly bound by
ﬁdelity to precedent, the democracy-reinforcing vein of takings jurisprudence predominant
since Penn Central that defers to the political process may yield to more hard-edged
categorical approaches. Cf. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the
Court will overrule next.”).
43. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 855–87 (1995) (laying out a politicalprocess-based theory of the Just Compensation Clause).
44. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 207. Other federalism-inﬂected
takings literature attends less to the horizontal distribution of decisionmaking power
between courts and the states and more to the vertical distribution of decisionmaking power
within the courts. See, e.g., Dana, Implications of Knick, supra note 16, at 605–13 (discussing
the substantive and procedural discourse in takings federalism); Siegel, supra note 16, at
461 (arguing that state courts have advantages over federal courts in developing property
law that reﬂects each state’s “unique history and physical landscape”). Neither vein of
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Professor Sterk’s account foregrounds the positivist puzzle inherent
in constitutional property.45 As the Supreme Court has made increasingly
clear, “background principles” of a state’s law of property play a central
role in the regulatory takings inquiry—a consideration that had always
undergirded the jurisprudence but was made explicit by the Court in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.46 Background principles are now central
to a panoply of regulatory takings issues, including shaping the
reasonableness of owner expectations47 and even, following Murr v.
Wisconsin, in terms of the deﬁnition of the property interest that is the
object of regulation.48 Centering the state’s deﬁnitional role in property
risks circularity—how can a regulatory change to a property interest
contravene the Takings Clause if the state is empowered to deﬁne property
interests? In practice, however, this positivist puzzle is unavoidable.49

takings federalism literature, however, has sufficiently focused on the vertical distribution
of decisionmaking power within the states. See infra Part III.
45. As Professor Frank Michelman described this legal-positivist puzzle:
By an argument that reaches back at least to Bentham, property’s scope
and content—property’s existence, even—are completely dependent
upon standing law. Thus, in contrast with liberty, property cannot stand
while the laws fall. My property is that to which the laws currently in force
give me a secured entitlement. In a vacuum of such laws, there can be no
property . . . .
....
. . . This state of the doctrine means that questions about the content and
meaning of historical state property law are potentially in issue every time
someone complains in court that a state government has violated the
Federal Constitution by taking property without paying for it. If a taking
of property can occur only when a government in some way perpetrates a
departure from the then-existing body of property law, then in order to
tell whether a given state action takes property you have to know what the
State’s property law as a matter of fact is—what that law as a matter of fact
says—at the moment when the action complained of takes place.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and
Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301, 305–10 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
46. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–29 (1992) (holding that even regulations that deprive land of
all economically beneﬁcial use need not be compensated if the limitations in the regulation
“inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership”).
47. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629–30 (2001) (noting that while not
dispositive, a state’s law of property—even statutory enactments—can shape owner expectations
over time).
48. See 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017) (“[C]ourts should give substantial weight to the
treatment of the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law.
The reasonable expectations of an acquirer of land must acknowledge legitimate
restrictions affecting his or her subsequent use and dispensation of the property.”).
49. This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court’s normative preference for state
common law in deﬁning “background principles,” at the expense of other sources of state
law such as state statutory and administrative law, is at all justiﬁed. See Timothy M. Mulvaney,
Foreground Principles, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 837, 866–77 (2013) (advocating a contextualized analysis that recognizes that background principles of the common law are

228

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:215

Professor Sterk outlines some distinctive jurisprudential challenges
arising from the intertwined state–federal structure of property rights.
First, the variation inherent in state law makes takings claims more
complex because “background principles” inherently vary from state to
state (and even potentially from locality to locality).50 What might
constitute a perfectly acceptable limitation on the expectations of owners
in New York City might be constitutionally intolerable in rural Montana.
This variational complexity, in turn, undermines the value of Supreme
Court guidance.51 When the Court, as it does in most contexts, imports
state-speciﬁc background principles into the equation, any resulting
decisional guidance can hardly set clear rules for governmental and
private actors—except, of course, to reinforce deference to the political
process.52
For Professor Sterk, however, this variation and complexity has virtues
worth embracing. The values of federalism, Sterk argues, support a
distributed regime that places state institutions—state law and state
courts—at the center of property protection.53 State courts and state
legislatures are institutionally well suited to oversee local land-use
regulation, on this view, because they are “insulated from many of the
pressures that face local regulators.”54 Other scholars have elaborated on
insufficient, in and of themselves, to address modern problems and to serve modern human
needs).
50. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 226–27; see also Maureen E. Brady,
Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property
Federalism, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 53, 56 (2017) (“Murr gives individual states’ positive
law of property short shrift, replacing the inquiry into the form and content of property
within a single jurisdiction with an analysis of reasonable property rules and expectations
that is divorced from jurisdictional boundaries.”). Sterk focused on the federalist dimension
of regulatory takings, but some of the same positivist complexity can be at play in aspects of
eminent domain as well, particularly with respect to questions of valuation and, to a lesser
extent (because it is not dependent on any given state’s deﬁnition of property) with respect
to the scope of public use in eminent domain.
51. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 228–33.
52. This deference to the political branches has signiﬁcant implications for the
allocation of decisionmaking about the constitutional boundaries of property. See infra
Parts II and III.
53. See Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 3, at 257–71 (“[T]he Court’s limited
intervention recognizes that property rights are the product of positive law created by the
several states and preserves the freedom of the states to deﬁne and protect those rights.”).
It bears drawing a distinction between federalism in the sense of procedural channeling—the
interplay of state and federal courts as venues for resolving takings claims, as raised by
Knick—and the substantive allocation of authority in terms of which body of law (federal,
state, or a hybrid) actually deﬁnes the boundaries of constitutional property. Which venues
are available and which substantive rules govern those venues are, of course, potentially
connected. Federal courts might bring different perspectives, resources, and institutional
capacity than state courts; state courts might be more attentive to local variation and political
process. But which legal system decides constitutional questions and which body of law
governs are not the same thing.
54. Id. at 206.
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arguments for decentralizing to the states in constitutional property by
emphasizing, for example, the values of experimentalism and interstate
competition for mobile residents and capital.55 And, as others have noted,
the traditional values of federalism—accountability, distributed power,
targeting, and responsiveness to preferences—can be a part of
rationalizing the centrality of states to takings law.56
This federalist reality—and it is hard to deny that this is functionally
how our system of constitutional property operates—has raised concerns
for some scholars. Commentators, for example, argue that relegating runof-the-mill takings concerns to the states treats property under the Takings
Clause as a second-class right, especially given the low threshold for
protecting property that the Supreme Court has set.57 Takings federalism,
the critique continues, undermines the value of uniformity no less in this
context than a democratically minimalist First Amendment or equal
protection doctrine would.58
A more targeted critique has come from scholars who question
whether the basic values inherent in federalism (or at least the protection
afforded by the states) bears out for takings. Professor Ilya Somin, for
example, argues that federalism is an insufficient protection because the
normal discipline of mobility does not work for owners unable to move
their property without considerable difficulty.59 And Professor Somin is
even more skeptical of federalism arguments sounding in the value of
superior knowledge at the state level, arguing that as between any
governmental actor and owners themselves, the latter has greater expertise
about their speciﬁc property and local conditions.60
Whatever one thinks of these critiques, however, the upshot of the
actual landscape of takings doctrine presents, at least in a functional sense,

55. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115
Yale L.J. 72, 92–101 (2005) (drawing on the literature on state competition in corporate law
as well as the mobility and public goods paradigm associated with Charles Tiebout to argue
for the utility of interstate competition in property).
56. See, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and
Local Land Use Decisions, 59 Md. L. Rev. 464, 490–513 (2000) (discussing the interplay
between the values of federalism and takings doctrine); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 888, 891–92
(2006) (defending deference in takings in light of federalism values).
57. See, e.g., Berger, What’s Federalism, supra note 2, at 12 (“If there is a role for
federalism, it lies in providing a mechanism for the states to provide more protection to
individuals than the U.S. Constitution mandates. Period.”).
58. Id. at 12–14 (asserting that uniformity in decisions regarding constitutional rights
typically supersedes federalism concerns and should do so for property rights as well).
59. Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 2, at 58 (“The main difficulty
with such competitive federalism arguments is that they fail to take adequate account of the
immobility of property rights in land.”).
60. Id. at 66; see also id. at 67 (arguing that “the argument from expertise and
interstate diversity would, if applied consistently, justify eliminating judicial protection of a
wide range of constitutional rights, not just property rights”).
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a deeply democratic vision of constitutional property,61 with the relevant
democratic process grounded in the states.62 This is not to argue that the
right to property protected by the Fifth Amendment is inherently
minimal—clearly that is not the case. But for the role that the Takings
Clause plays in constraining regulatory choice and setting the limits of
legitimate public use, the Supreme Court has made clear—again within
broad outer boundaries—that the political arena is the appropriate one
for resolving the tradeoffs inherent in balancing individual ownership and
community imperatives. In practice, evaluating the allocation of burdens
in property transitions demands deeply contextualized value judgments
about owner expectations, the texture of harm to the public that any given
regulation is addressing, and even more fundamental questions about the
nature of markets and larger constitutional values.63 Takings law thus
serves in our legal system to vindicate a “right to justiﬁcation,”64 but it does
so in a way that reinforces property’s role as a fundamentally democratic
institution.
One way to understand Professor Sterk’s essential insight, ultimately,
is that when the Supreme Court sets a relatively low baseline of property
protection, it is implicitly empowering the states to determine the
appropriate calibration of individual rights and community needs, and
thereby endorsing variation on that calibration exercise, rather than a
strong, singular standard. This is not dissimilar from how most rights work,
such as in the context of speech, equality, due process, and other
fundamental rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court always sets a ﬂoor of
uniformity above which state and local political systems are free to offer
greater protection. But constitutional property distinctively elevates, within
very wide outer boundaries, the role of state positive law—and political
process—in determining the baseline for federal constitutional
protection.
61. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 145, 150–58
(2018) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings] (articulating a democratic
approach to regulatory takings law); Singer, The Ownership Society, supra note 41, at 330
(arguing that property law exhibits a “citizenship model” in which owners undertake duties
to “refrain from actions that endanger . . . a free and democratic society that treats all
individuals with equal concerns and respect”).
62. In a recent essay, Professor Carol Rose offers a more critical view. See Carol M.
Rose, Rations and Takings, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 343, 359 (suggesting that while the Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence generally shows a “pattern of tolerance” toward state and
local land regulation of property, the jurisprudence is “punctuated by cannonades that
undermine state and local resource management”). This Article does not argue that the
Supreme Court is intentionally deferential to state and local political processes out of some
respect for the comparative advantages of subfederal governance. Rather, because the
Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence that relegates the overwhelming majority of
cases to tests that are functionally politically deferential—albeit, as Professor Rose notes,
with some blunt exceptions—the result is a doctrine that privileges the political process.
63. See Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra note 61, at 158.
64. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rainer Forst, The Right to
Justiﬁcation: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice 2 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2012)).
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Unpacking the States: Local Governments in Constitutional Property

If much of the texture of property interests in takings law is
determined democratically within the states, it is critical to remember that
in that project of constitutional explication, states are not unitary. States
govern in many fundamental ways through local governments, particularly
so in policy domains such as land use and infrastructure that frequently
raise constitutional property rights questions. As a result, local governments are central to the democratic construction of constitutional property. Although familiar ground, this section rehearses the litany of critical
constitutional property cases that have involved local governments to
illustrate their role across the breadth of the doctrine.
The proper regulatory role for local governments is increasingly
contested,65 but authority over land use and the built environment has
always been at the center of local lawmaking in the United States.66 That
continues to be true today, with local governments playing the primary
regulatory role not only on questions of zoning, subdivision regulation,
development permitting, and other foundational matters of land-use law,
but also—more controversially—in housing law, rent regulation,
environmental protection, historic preservation, and the like.67 All of these
distinctly local regulatory regimes have generated important takings cases.
There are, of course, many signiﬁcant takings cases where the federal
government is the defendant,68 and the same can be said about the states.69

65. Compare Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 15–18 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism]
(arguing that local governments have long “wielded substantial lawmaking power and
undertaken important public initiatives”), with Schragger, The Attack on American Cities,
supra note 17, at 1184–95 (arguing that “hostility to city regulation” is an “enduring feature
of American federalism”).
66. See Stuart Banner, American Property: A History of How, Why, and What We Own
182–85 (2011) (discussing the long history of local government land-use regulation); John
F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Signiﬁcance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv.
L. Rev. 1252, 1259–81 (1996) (recounting the Founding-era local-land-use regulatory
landscape); see also Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design,
Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 231, 236 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing
descriptive and normative view of land use involves, ﬁrst and foremost, local control.”).
67. See, e.g., John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a
Housing Crisis, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 823, 832–34 (2019) (discussing the controversy regarding
the “ideal vertical allocation of power between state and local governments” in housing
regulation); Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental
Renaissance, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 305, 337–47 (2020) (describing a new wave of urban
environmental laws as local governments begin regulating environmental protection).
68. See supra note 5.
69. For a seminal case, see Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1922)
(challenging Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act). For others, see supra note 5; see also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987) (Pennsylvania Subsidence
Act); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984) (Hawaii Land Reform Act of
1967); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415–16 (1934) (Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Law); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 653 (1887) (Kansas liquor law).
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But a broad array of major takings cases over the century since Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon70 have involved local governments.71
Not surprisingly, to begin, cases involving the boundaries of public
use for condemning property implicate distinctly local challenges. A
paradigm example is the case that set the contemporary terms of “public
use” under the Takings Clause, Berman v. Parker.72 Berman grew out of the
post–World War II wave of urban redevelopment sparked by the federal
American Housing Act of 1949 and grappled with the problem of blight
and condemnation in the urban core (in this case, southwest Washington,
D.C.).73 A little more than ﬁfty years later, the Supreme Court in Kelo v.
City of New London again returned to the scope of public use, grappling
with questions arising from modern iterations of urban renewal and
whether eminent domain can be deployed for economic development.74
Deﬁning the relevant property interest and parcel for purposes of
regulatory takings has likewise implicated local governments. The leading
case on point now, Murr v. Wisconsin, involved a challenge to a county-level
ordinance that mandated lot mergers.75 But the modern debate about
conceptual severance—the question of the “denominator” in regulatory
takings cases—can be traced in large measure to Penn Central’s debate
about the appropriate parcel at issue in that case.76
Of course, the largest category of regulatory takings cases involves
local authority over land use and the built environment. The litany of such
cases is long and covers everything from basic zoning77 to historic
70. 260 U.S. at 393.
71. Cf. Michael Allan Wolf, The Brooding Omnipresence of Regulatory Takings:
Urban Origins and Effects, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1835, 1837–39 (2013) (noting the
distinctly urban setting of many classic regulatory takings conﬂicts, from Scranton in Mahon
to New York City in Penn Central and many other examples). Not to fetishize the Supreme
Court, especially given the reality that most takings cases are resolved at the state level or by
the lower federal courts, but the terms of the discourse have been framed by a relatively
circumscribed set of landmark Supreme Court cases.
72. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
73. Id. at 30 (explaining that sixty-four percent of dwellings in the area at issue were
beyond repair). In the era of post-War urban renewal, Berman was a legal outlier, in that the
statute at issue—the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-592,
60 Stat. 790 (1946) (codiﬁed at D.C. Code §§ 5-701 to 5-719 (1973))—was actually federal,
not local, given the then-direct oversight that Congress exercised over the District of
Columbia.
74. 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
75. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017).
76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (noting
that the relevant parcel for evaluating the claim was the “city tax block designated as the
‘landmark site’”). Contra id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the city had
taken the appellees’ air rights). Grand Central Station had been developed as part of a much
larger city-within-the-city, and the appropriate boundaries for evaluating the alleged
regulatory constraints at issue in the case were not as intuitive as it might seem at ﬁrst blush.
77. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 624 (1981)
(rezoning to an agricultural category); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 257 (1980)
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preservation,78 local environmental protection,79 rent control,80 and various
other areas of local authority.81 Similarly, local governments are central
players in those cases at the intersection of takings law and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine involving challenges to conditions, or
“exactions,” that are attached to development permits.82
In sum, local governments are by no means the only domain for
generating signiﬁcant constitutional property cases, but they inarguably
provide the central arena through which constitutional property frictions
are resolved.83
Although takings claims arise across the entire spectrum of property
interests,84 it is a curious aspect of the doctrine that the regulatory realm
that is most local in nature—land use—seems to generate more claims
than other regulatory regimes. It is hard to say exactly why, but perhaps
there is a psychology to the tangible nature of the kinds of real property
and land-related regulatory regimes that tend to generate constitutional
property frictions at the local level.85 There is also the logic—somewhat
(density restrictions); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 604–05 (1927) (building set-back
ordinance); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915) (prohibition on brickyards);
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 103 (1909) (height limitation).
78. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107–15.
79. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 590 (1962) (reviewing a
town ordinance regulating sand and gravel dredging and pit excavating).
80. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (reviewing a rent
control ordinance applicable to mobile homes); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1921)
(reviewing a law requiring that existing tenancies continue after lease expiration in certain
contexts).
81. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421
(1982) (reviewing a law requiring the installation of cable facilities).
82. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599, 601–02
(2013) (concerning the denial of a land-use permit after the applicant refused to consent
to proposed wetland mitigation conditions); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377
(1994) (concerning land-use permit conditions related to ﬂood control and traffic improvements); see also Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231, 1231 (1994), remanded to 911
P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (concerning land-use permit conditions related to public recreational
facilities and art, with the U.S. Supreme Court vacating and remanding in light of Dolan).
83. Local governments have also ﬁgured prominently in the two best-known cases
involving the exhaustion of claims in the takings context. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan.
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186–94 (1985) (holding that the
takings issue was not ripe before exhausting available administrative procedures); see also
Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019) (overruling Williamson County).
84. Claimants raise Takings Clause challenges to interference with everything from
personal property to intellectual property to more conceptually esoteric interests, such as
federal ﬁshing licenses and taxi medallions. See Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two,
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 916 (2016) (“[R]egulatory property . . . includes such assets as
pollution credits, ﬁshing quotas, taxi medallions, ﬁnancial guarantees, and the
telecommunications spectrum, among many others.”); Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic
Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab Medallions, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 125, 137–39
(2013) (discussing whether taxicab medallions are property under the Takings Clause).
85. This could also help explain why so many claims against states seem to involve
environmental limitations on real property.
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circular, but real nonetheless—that the Supreme Court has signaled
greater solicitude for real property, implicitly relegating personal and
intangible property to a more peripheral status in takings jurisprudence.86
That solicitude shapes expectations, which in turn can shape the kinds of
claims owners feel entitled to bring.87
*

*

*

Property paradigmatically allows owners to plan securely in a system
that protects their reasonable expectations over time, but communities
must also retain the ability to adjust the terms of ownership in response to
changing social and economic exigencies. Takings law helps to manage
that tension, but in doing so, raises fundamental questions about how to
strike the right balance. The discourse on takings federalism answers those
questions by emphasizing the state political process in deﬁning the
boundaries of constitutional property.
Many of the most iconic cases that have come to deﬁne the jurisprudence, however, have involved local governments. It is clear that local
government regulatory authority—and broader action in domains such as
condemnation for urban renewal and infrastructure—have put that level
of government at the heart of takings. Regardless of whether the deference
the Supreme Court has shown to state and local political processes is
warranted, that deference is thus not merely a question of federalism.
Rather, it is also a question of localism: how to allocate authority (in this
instance over the boundaries of property rights) within the states? In the
modern era of takings jurisprudence, state legislatures have not been
passive on that question, as Part II explains.
II. THE STATE–LOCAL DYNAMIC IN TAKINGS LAW
As Part I highlighted, the jurisprudence of the Takings Clause extends
great deference to property redeﬁnitions reached through state and local
democratic processes. Beneath this takings federalism lies the question of
how to allocate authority to delineate the contours of property interests
between these subfederal levels of government. This Part turns to the
86. See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustiﬁed Preference for
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 Ecology L.Q. 227, 234–46 (2004)
(documenting the distinctions often drawn between real and personal property across
takings jurisprudence). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Horne v. Department of
Agriculture can be interpreted to moderate the Court’s prior support for this distinction,
though the breadth or narrowness of the class of takings disputes to which Horne applies is
not yet evident. See 57 U.S. 350, 357–58 (2015) (discussing the direct appropriation of
personal property rather than regulation on the use of that property).
87. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 Ecology L.Q. 89, 127–28 (1995) [hereinafter Byrne, Ten Arguments] (noting
that landowners raising takings challenges stand a greater chance of prevailing than owners
of personal property); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine
and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 605, 653 (1996) (same).
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state–local interplay on key touchpoints in the development of constitutional property law.88 Despite case law that treats state and local levels
of government with equal deference in takings cases, state legislatures have
engaged in what can only be described as a broad, long-standing, and
ongoing project of limiting local-government discretion in this space.
Many state statutes directly and exclusively constrain local-government
authority. Yet even where, as is often the case, property rights statutes
facially apply to both local and state levels of government, many of the
regulatory tools the statutes constrain—such as zoning, eminent domain,
development moratoria, contiguous lot mergers, impact fees, and historic
designation—are of the variety that only local governments would have
any regular occasion to implement.89 Indeed, a vast portion of land-use
regulation is local in nature; state and federal regulation of land uses
complements this expansive body of local law only in relatively select
contexts, perhaps most prominently in environmental protection and
antidiscrimination.90 Thus, even statutes that on their face apply to all
governmental entities reﬂect burdens that are most acutely borne at the
local level.91
This Part organizes these statutory checks on local governments into
four categories: liability expansions, procedural impositions, speciﬁc
88. Property is, of course, a social institution in the sense that it regularly requires
governmental entities to make choices in the face of conﬂicting claims to ﬁnite resources.
See John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 339, 344–45 (1989)
(“[L]egal property rights are shaped and limited by the many competing needs of the
general welfare.”); C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in Property: Mainstream
and Critical Positions 1, 1 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (“The actual institution [of
property], and the way people see it, . . . all change over time. The changes are related to
changes in the purposes which society . . . expect[s] the institution of property to serve.”).
These social choices deﬁne the content of the relationships—between taxpayers and their
representatives, employers and employees, developers and consumers, landlords and
tenants, creditors and debtors, neighbors vis-à-vis neighbors, etc.—that we collectively have
decided reﬂect the values of our democracy, such as liberty, equality, due process, and free
speech. Whether, why, and how we might turn to local as opposed to state levels of
government to exercise this decisional authority and, thereby, serve these fundamental
values, are profound questions that sit at the heart of the U.S. legal system. This Article,
though, concentrates on a speciﬁc set of property issues that are uniquely correlated with one
particular—and particularly important—corner of law: constitutional takings
jurisprudence.
89. See Robert Ellickson, Vicki L. Been, Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Christopher Serkin,
Land Use Controls, at xxxvii (5th ed. 2021) (“Three basic players participate in the land use
‘game’—landowners/developers, neighbors, and governments (usually local ones).”).
90. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983,
985 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming the designation of 850,000 acres of land as critical habitat for
endangered species on which development would be severely restricted in accordance with
a federal environmental statute); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274,
276 (Alaska 1994) (enforcing a state statute prohibiting landlords from discriminating
against prospective tenants on the basis of marital status).
91. This Part notes a few outlier property rights statutes that pertain as much to state
authority as to local authority.
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limitations, and property owner empowerments. Liability expansions
include those legislative efforts that aim to increase the likelihood—
relative to takings jurisprudence’s baseline—that a claimant will be
awarded compensation as a result of alleged regulatory interferences with
property rights. Procedural impositions create costly administrative
hurdles that preemptively aim to discourage the adoption of regulations
that might amount to takings in the ﬁrst place. Speciﬁc limitations
preempt or constrain the use of particular regulatory tools outright. And
while property owner empowerments do not directly restrict the exercise
of local regulatory authority, they equip landowners with tools to resist it.
In these categories, there are some instances of causal connections
between individual takings cases and legislative measures. The principal
aim of this section, however, is not to hone in on such connections but to
highlight the breadth of situations in which the categories of state
legislation identiﬁed in this Article correlate with the local regulatory tools
and approaches that have driven takings jurisprudence in so many
important respects.92
A.

Liability Expansions

State legislatures have enacted various measures increasing the
likelihood that claimants will be awarded compensation for alleged
regulatory interference with their property rights. These measures either
deﬁne the liability threshold more favorably to claimants than the
threshold required by takings jurisprudence, or limit defenses available to
government defendants in takings and related compensation cases.93
1. Compensation Remedies. — As to the ﬁrst approach, statutes in some
states create a remedy of compensation—separate and apart from
constitutional takings remedies—when regulation diminishes land value
beyond a deﬁned threshold94 or produces an “inordinate burden” on an
92. Some scholars have argued that state takings legislation can be purely symbolic.
See, e.g., Morriss, supra note 14, at 240 (arguing that some of the post-Kelo state legislative
response imposed no signiﬁcant substantive change in the exercise of eminent domain).
That is contestable for much of the sweep of the legislation this Part surveys; even statutes
designed to signal, however, can matter substantively in chilling the scope of legal responses.
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
93. Legislators unsuccessfully attempted to enact both forms at the federal level in the
1990s. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings Legislation: Where It Stands and What Is Next, 23 Ecology
L.Q. 509, 509–11 (1996).
94. See La. Stat. Ann. § 3:3610 (2019) (requiring compensation for prospective state
and local regulations that reduce the market value of agricultural or forest lands by more
than twenty percent of their preregulation value); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-7, -9 (2020)
(requiring compensation for prospective state and local regulations that reduce the market
value of agricultural or forest lands by more than forty percent of their preregulation value);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.305 (2019) (requiring compensation for prospective state and local
regulations that reduce the market value of any property). The Oregon statute served to
amend prior legislation adopted via a plebiscite that had generated billions of dollars in
compensation claims as a result of its prospective and retroactive allocation. 1 Bill Bradbury,
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individual claimant.95 For example, Mississippi law requires compensation
upon the adoption of regulations that reduce the market value of
Off. of the Sec’y of State, Voters’ Pamphlet: State Measures 103–04 (2004),
http://records.sos.state.or.us/ORSOSWebDrawer/RecordView/6873502 (on ﬁle with
Columbia Law Review). A Texas statute requires compensation for prospective regulations
affecting residential development and farming and forestry practices that reduce the market
value of agricultural or forest lands by more than twenty-ﬁve percent of their preregulation
value. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2007.002, .024 (2019). Peculiarly, however, municipalities are
largely exempt from these strictures. Id. § 2007.003(a)–(b) (deeming municipal regulations
subject to the statute only in those instances in which a municipal regulation impacts
property owners within its extraterritorial jurisdiction but does not apply across the
municipality’s entire extraterritorial jurisdiction). Legislators in a number of other states
proposed but were unable to gain passage of diminution-in-value statutes. See H.R. 1054,
2005–2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006); Private Property Protection Act, H.R. 663,
121st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2003); An Act Relating to State and Municipal Regulatory
Actions Relating to or Affecting Private Property; and Providing for an Effective Date, H.B.
484, 22d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2002); Private Property Protection Act, H.R. 2773, 80th Leg.,
Continuing Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1998). In other states, voters rejected legislation of this nature
through the initiative process. See 90 Government Acquisition, Regulation of Private
Property: California Proposition 90, at 90–95, 187–89 (2006), https://repository.uchastings.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2257&context=ca_ballot_props [https://perma.cc/CR98-D227];
Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote, at xvii–xviii (2006), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
sov/2006-general/complete_sov.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K28-EWTF] (showing the defeat of
Proposition 90 in the 2006 general election); see also 2006 Proposed Ballot Initiatives, Idaho
Sec’y of State, https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/06init08.htm [https://perma.cc/2AM2DB5D] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020); November 7, 2006 General Election Results, Idaho Sec’y
of State, https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/results/2006/general/tot_stwd.htm [https://perma.cc/
BRQ4-D58R] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (recording the defeat of Proposition 2 in the 2006
general election). In still others, such initiatives never made it to the ballot in light of
procedural illegalities. See Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rts., Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235,
1245 (Nev. 2006) (holding that the Nevada Property Owners’ Bill of Rights Initiative
violated the statutory single-subject requirements); In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 142 P.3d
400, 402 (Okla. 2006) (holding that the Protect Our Homes Initiative violated the singleissue rule by focusing on both eminent domain and regulatory takings); 2006 Initiative
Petitions Approved for Circulation in Missouri: Constitutional Amendment to Article I—
Eminent Domain (version 2), Mo. Sec’y of State, https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/
2006petitions/ipEminentDomainI-36 [https://perma.cc/3H5L-WGQN] (last visited Oct.
11, 2020); 2006 Ballot Issue I-154, Mont. Sec’y of State, https://sosmt.gov/elections/
ballot_issues/2006-2/i-154 [https://perma.cc/U6XZ-D2ZS] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020); Title
Board Results: Proposed Initiative 2005–2006 #86, Colo. Sec’y of State,
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/results/2005-2006/
result86-0506.html [https://perma.cc/8EKZ-RS7Z] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
95. See Fla. Stat. § 70.001 (2020) (requiring compensation for prospective state and
local regulations that “inordinately burden” any property). An “inordinate burden” is
deﬁned as government action that
directly restrict[s] or limit[s] the use of real property such that the
property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable,
investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or
a vested right to a speciﬁc use of the real property with respect to the real
property as a whole, or that the property owner is left with existing or
vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears
permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good
of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large.
Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
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agricultural lands by more than forty percent of their preregulation
value.96
In their best light, these statutes developed out of a view that litigating
constitutional takings claims is often too costly, time-consuming, and
unpredictable, and even where takings outcomes are predictable, those
outcomes are unprincipled and insufficiently protective of property
rights.97 The foundation for this perspective commonly rests with the
Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Penn Central, which identiﬁed a
nonexclusive list of considerations that are relevant to a court’s
determination in an individual takings case as to whether an imposition
stemming from a new regulatory safeguard or obligation is fair and just,
absent compensation.98 Interestingly, these compensation statutes
originally arose in the years following several Supreme Court decisions
that carved out instances in which Penn Central’s “ad hocery” did not
apply.99 Perhaps proponents of these statutes saw momentum and
guidance in these decisions;100 or perhaps, instead, they saw these
supposedly “bright-line” takings decisions as too limited in scope.101
Supporters claim that the clearer—indeed, categorical—standards set
out in property rights statutes force government entities, via the ﬁscal
pressure of a compensation remedy, to better account for the costs of

96. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-1 to -17.
97. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 14, at 220 (suggesting that advocacy for compensation
statutes and takings impact assessment statutes arose out of a perception of “growing
government regulation” and “dissatisfaction with the current state of constitutional takings
law”).
98. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24, 130–31 (1978)
(identifying “economic impact,” interference with “distinct investment-backed expectations,”
and “the character of the governmental action” as relevant considerations).
99. The peak period of the compensation-statute movement came in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. In this period, the Supreme Court subjected at least some permit conditions
and all regulations that eliminate economically available uses to more probing levels of
scrutiny than Penn Central commands. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)
(placing the burden of proof on the government, as the defendant in a takings case, to
prove that a condition attached to a development permit is in “rough proportionality” with
the approved development’s anticipated impacts); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015–16 (1992) (declaring that regulations that deprive land of all economically
valuable uses generally trigger takings liability); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987) (placing the burden of proof on the government, as the defendant in a
takings case, to prove that a condition attached to a development permit bore an “essential
nexus” to the approved development’s anticipated impacts).
100. See, e.g., William A. Van Vactor, Jr., Note, The Backlash to Land Use Regulation
Continues: An Analysis of Oregon’s Measure 37, 26 J. Land, Res. & Env’t L. 221, 222–24
(2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Commission galvanized proponents of compensation statutes).
101. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369, 1369–70 (1993) (describing Lucas as “something of a
high water mark in takings jurisprudence” but declaring the Court’s attempt to distinguish
between total and partial takings as “so rickety that it must fall under its own weight”).
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regulatory programs.102 This accountability, the argument continues,
promotes more transparent, cost-conscious choices about which potential
regulations to adopt and which to forego.103 With these measures, then,
state legislatures sought to create a regulatory environment more
favorable to property owners fearful of interference with existing property
rights than the politically deferential model under extant judicial
interpretations of the Takings Clause.104
These statutes pursue this goal through two general means. First, the
bulk of these statutes create liability structures that rest solely on the lost
value generated by regulation.105 This shifts the focus from a broad inquiry
that accounts for the extent to which regulation prevents conduct that
burdens other properties and the community at large,106 to a narrow
102. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from
the Oregon Experiment, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1281, 1284 (2009) (describing the evidence
for and against the claim that governments will consider regulatory costs if subjected to
compensation requirements for the impairment of property values).
103. In the face of critiques that property rights legislation would bankrupt local
governments, supporters asserted that these statutes would actually impose very few costs
because government entities would avoid having to make payments by adopting a more
limited set of regulations. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Porter, Will Property Rights Legislation
Endanger Smart Growth Efforts?, 30 Real Est. L.J. 275, 299–302 (2002) (“If legislators know
that the cost [of regulations] will be borne by state and local governments, they have an
incentive to make the regulation as focused and limited as it can be . . . .”).
104. Critics contend that such statutes fail to acknowledge the many beneﬁts regulation
confers, thereby effectively requiring government entities to pay landowners not to harm
others via pollution, wetland degradation, and the like. See, e.g., Berger, The Illusion, supra
note 37, at 11, 40. The extensive costs of doing so will, in turn, create a chilling effect to
regulation that resultantly leaves the lands of those downwind/downstream/downslope in
harm’s way. See id. at 34–37 (“Full compensation requirements do not lead to more efficient
regulations; they simply shut regulation down.”); Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note
14, at 444 (“The virtually invariable effect of successful state takings legislation has been to
force state and local governments to not adopt laws and regulations they otherwise would
have adopted and to not enforce restrictions already on the books.”); Sugameli, supra note
14, at 579–80 (“Provisions . . . that mandate that payments will come out of the budget of
the agency . . . provide a powerful incentive for agencies to grant permits that will harm the
health, safety and property of neighbors . . . .”). But see Daniel H. Cole, Political
Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141, 177–78 (2007) (“It is not clear . . . whether (and to what extent)
the existence of these takings statutes has induced state and local governments to reduce
regulatory impositions in order to avoid liability for compensation . . . .”).
105. Florida’s law is the exception in that it focuses less on the diminution in value than
it does on the extent to which the claimant’s investment expectations have been dashed.
See Fla. Stat. § 70.001(3)(e) (2020). Still, any award under Florida’s statute seeks to bridge
the difference in value between the value of the property with and without the regulation
creating the “inordinate burden.” Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
106. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for
S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (rejecting diminution in value as a dispositive variable in a
regulatory takings case). The lone exception in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence
involves those instances in which regulation denies all economically viable uses of a parcel
of land and thereby reduces the value of that parcel to zero. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–20, 1030 (1992). This “exception” is subject to its own
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inquiry focused exclusively on the economic burdens of regulation.
Second, these statutes dissolve the traditional takings claimant’s burden
to prove that the government is not justiﬁed in proceeding absent
compensation and instead impose the burden on government defendants
to prove that they are so justiﬁed.107 This burden, according to a recent
empirical study, falls heavily on local governments, who serve as the
defendant in a far higher percentage of regulatory takings cases than their
state counterparts.108
That such statutes constrain land-use regulation—either through
explicit application or by creating a chilling effect—is self-evident,109

qualiﬁcations and, thus, has hardly been applied categorically. See Timothy M. Mulvaney,
Property-as-Society, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 911, 953–54 [hereinafter Mulvaney, Property-AsSociety] (“[T]he Murr Court described Lucas as merely offering ‘guidelines’ relevant to
‘determining when government regulation is so onerous that it constitutes a taking.’”
(quoting Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017))).
107. But these statutes often allow the government to repeal or modify its proposed
action to avoid the compensation requirement. Therefore, only if a government action
amounted to a taking under the Constitution (not merely the statute) would compensation
be appropriate for the interim period during which the regulation was in effect before the
government withdrew it, in accord with the Supreme Court’s temporary takings
jurisprudence. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[W]here the government’s activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve
it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective.”).
108. Professors Krier and Sterk recently conducted an exhaustive empirical assessment
of the more than 2,000 reported takings decisions handed down in the lower courts between
1978 and 2012. Krier & Sterk, supra note 9. Of the approximately 1,200 reported cases in
which a property owner challenged a regulation as a taking (excluding takings challenges
to regulations designed to prevent against ﬂooding, which the researchers addressed
separately), nearly 900 involved claims against local government entities, while fewer than
300 involved claims against state government entities in federal courts. Id. at 71 tbl.5, 78
tbl.8. The small remainder involved claims against federal government entities. Id. at 78 tbl.8.
109. In terms of explicit applications, for example, before Oregon’s voters substantially
reduced the impact of Measure 37 through another ballot initiative three years after the
measure’s passage in 2004, more than 7,000 claims had been ﬁled against state and county
governments seeking a total of $17 billion in compensation. See Or. Dep’t of Land &
Conservation Dev., Ballot Measures 37 (2004) and 49 (2007) Outcomes and Effects 5 (2011),
https://www.oregon.gov/lcd/Measure49/Documents/M49_BallotMeasures37_and_49_O
utcomesEffects_2011.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y5U-UNKA]. These local governments
found no viable ﬁscal option but to forego enforcement of regulations on zoning,
subdivision, farming and forestry practices, transportation, and the like that allegedly
diminished property values. See Berger, The Illusion, supra note 37, at 34. That a statute
has been applied in only a small number of instances, however—or even has not been
applied in any instances at all, as has reportedly been the case with Mississippi’s forty percent
diminution-in-value statute—is not necessarily evidence that the statute lacks substantive
effect. See Miss. Code Ann. § 49-33-7, -9 (2020); Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 14,
at 518 (noting Mississippi’s forty percent diminution-in-value statute has never been
litigated). Rather, the statute may well be doing its work by incentivizing regulators to avoid
even approaching the forty-percent threshold and potentially triggering a claim for
compensation. See Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 14, at 518 (noting the lack of
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although this is made especially clear where statutes exempt government
actions that provide relief from existing regulations. For example, under
Florida’s statute, landowners cannot claim compensation on the ground
that the government’s granting of a variance to a neighbor triggered a
reduction in the value of their property.110 Given the overall size of localgovernment budgets and the relatively more limited avenues by which they
can raise revenues, local entities in all but perhaps the nation’s largest
cities are more ﬁscally risk averse than their state-level counterparts.111 For
this reason, any chilling effect resulting from compensation statutes is
considerably more pronounced at the local level. Academic disagreement
regarding these statutes centers not on whether they impose a chilling
effect on local land-use regulation but rather on how extensive that effect
might be.112
litigation “is probably in part because Mississippi has never pursued strict regulations of
farm and agricultural lands”); see also supra note 104.
110. Fla. Stat. § 70.001(3)(e). On the possibility of nonenforcement of existing
regulations giving rise to takings liability, see Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra
note 61, at 185.
111. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1665–70. This Article assumes that
democratic measures hold government officials to some account for their budgetary
management. It does not contend, however, that monetary costs are always wholly
commensurate with political costs. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain
Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 994–95 (noting that it is not “realistic to think that higher
levels of compensation will necessarily dissuade governmental entities from succumbing to
political pressures” because the “pain from budgetary outlays” is “attenuated by the
operation of the political process”); Levinson, supra note 37, at 346–47 (discussing how any
model of the interaction between monetary and political costs is “highly contextual,
complex, and controversial”); Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1644–65
(explaining that local governments may exhibit a stronger relationship between monetary
and political costs “because the costs and beneﬁts of local government actions are born[e]
by the same people who control the political process”); Katrina Miriam Wyman, The
Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 239, 246–48 (2007) (noting that
monetary costs do not directly translate into political costs because “taxpayers, not
government decision makers, pay the monetary costs of government decisions”).
112. Compare Charles C. Carter & John Taylor, Current Status of Property Rights
Compensation Statutes, 35 Real Est. L.J. 405, 411 (2006) (presenting the argument that
“Florida’s legislature wouldn’t have gone to so much trouble if all they meant to do was to
make it a little easier for land owners to gain compensation”), with Richard Grosso & Robert
Hartsell, Old McDonald Still Has a Farm: Agricultural Property Rights After the Veto of S.B.
1712, 79 Fla. Bar J. 41, 44 (2005) (suggesting that Florida’s statute was “not intended to
drastically affect Florida’s growth management or environmental laws”). In the face of
claims for compensation, local governments almost universally agree to waive enforcement
of the challenged regulation. See Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 14, at 488 (noting
the local concern that paying compensation to a party allegedly burdened by a generally
applicable regulation in one case would generate many more claims from owners subject to
the same regulation).
Examples of local-government decisions to abandon proposed regulation or weaken
existing regulation in the face of a threat of compensation claims under these statutes
abound. See, e.g., id. at 462–69. While the actual impacts of these statutes have not been
empirically assessed, they assuredly vary across the adopting jurisdictions in light of their
distinctive backdrops. The statutes in Florida and Oregon, and similarly though to a lesser
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2. Limitations on Takings Defenses. — Some state statutes increase the
likelihood that claimants will be awarded compensation for alleged
regulatory interference with property rights by limiting the defenses
available to the government. In some instances, such limitations are
explicit. Consider, for example, the takings defense that a regulation
merely precludes a land use that could have been declared a nuisance at
common law, as set out explicitly in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council 113 and underpinning a lengthy run of cases that preceded it.114
State legislatures have limited this defense with ubiquitous “right-to-farm”
statutes that excuse at least some agricultural activities from nuisance
liability.115 In these circumstances, local governments are precluded from
regulating the harmful impacts that farm operators can impose on their
neighbors.116
Like nuisance law, the customary use doctrine and the public trust
doctrine have also shielded local governments from liability in numerous
takings cases.117 But some state legislatures have narrowed the
extent in Arizona, were adopted against the backdrop of fairly extensive land-use regulatory
programs. The statutes in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, on the other hand, were
adopted in states that lack strong traditions of land-use regulation.
113. 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992).
114. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277–80 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 406 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658, 667 (1887).
115. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 2-4-107 (2020) (“[A]n agricultural operation shall not
be found to be a public or private nuisance if the agricultural operation alleged to be a
nuisance employs methods or practices that are commonly or reasonably associated with
agricultural production.”); Ga. Code Ann. § 41-1-7 (2020) (“No agricultural facility . . . shall
be or shall become a nuisance, either public or private, as a result of changed conditions in
or around the locality of such facility or operation if the facility or operation has been in
operation for one year or more.”); Miss. Code. Ann. § 95-3-29 (2020) (“In any nuisance
action, public or private, against an agricultural operation, including forestry activity, proof
that . . . [it] has existed for one (1) year or more is an absolute defense to the nuisance
action . . . .”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5753 (2020) (creating a rebuttable presumption that
agricultural activity is not a nuisance if it is consistent with good agricultural practices, is
established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities, has not signiﬁcantly changed
since commencement of surrounding activities, and complies with other applicable law).
The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors ex rel. Kossuth County
presents the rare exception calling these statutes into question absent takings
compensation. See 584 N.W.2d 309, 319–22 (Iowa 1998) (declaring that, by licensing one
landowner’s creation of a nuisance, the county effectively transferred to that landowner a
property interest in the form of an easement across a neighbor’s land and ﬁnding that such
a transfer is the proper subject of takings review).
116. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Beidel, Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Farm Law: A Relief for Farmers
or an Unconstitutional Taking?, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 163, 171 (2005) (“The law limits the
ability of municipalities to create local ordinances that define ‘normal agricultural operations’
as public nuisances.”).
117. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that a Washington land owner did not hold a compensable property interest
in his proposal to build private residences on elevated platforms above navigable tidelands
because the construction’s purpose “was inconsistent with the public trust that the State . . .
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circumstances in which the government can assert that a regulation
supporting public access to beaches preserves a customary use,118 while
others have considered eliminating altogether the defense that a
challenged regulation protects property held in trust for the public.119
In other instances, state legislation walks back available takings
defenses in more subtle ways. For example, a number of state property
rights statutes exempt regulations enacted to protect public “health and
safety.”120 In so doing, they silently omit the more capacious, traditional
takings defense that a regulation serves the public welfare by precluding
detrimental and often localized impacts that are less directly connected to
public health and safety. These impacts include the often diffused harms
that odors, noise, pollution, and the like can impose on natural
resources;121 development designs that run counter to the aesthetic
desirability and cohesion of neighborhoods;122 and degradation of
communities’ cultural and historic character.123
is obligated to protect”); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993)
(“We . . . hold the doctrine of custom as applied to public use of Oregon’s dry sand areas is
one of ‘the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property . . . already
place upon land ownership.’ . . . [P]laintiffs have never had the property interests that they
claim were taken . . . .” (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992))).
118. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 163.035 (2020) (requiring that the government, before
adopting a beach access regulation on the grounds that it preserves a customary recreational
public use, provide notice of a public hearing at which it bears the burden of proving that
the use has been “ancient, reasonable, without interruption, and free from dispute”).
119. See, e.g., H.R. 597, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(8) (Mont. 1995) (“The public trust
doctrine is speciﬁcally excluded as a defense of any taking of private property or real
property by private persons or public agencies.”).
120. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1134(B)(1) (2020) (exempting from diminution-invalue remedies those “land use laws that . . . [l]imit or prohibit a use or division of real
property for the protection of the public’s health and safety”); Miss. Code Ann. § 49-337(e)–(f) (exempting from diminution-in-value remedies regulations that restrict activities
that “constitute a public nuisance under common law” or are “harmful to the public health
and safety”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.305(3)(a)–(b) (2019) (exempting from diminution-invalue remedies regulations that restrict activities “commonly and historically recognized as
public nuisances under common law” or that otherwise were enacted “for the protection of
public health and safety”).
121. See, e.g., R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 298 (Alaska 2001)
(rejecting a takings challenge to a setback requirement that was part of a wetlands protection
scheme due to “the unique ecological and economic value that wetlands provide in protecting
water quality, regulating local hydrology, preventing flooding, and preventing erosion”).
122. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (open space); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396–97 (1926) (zoning); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91,
107–08 (1909) (building height limitation); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69
(1887) (“A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public beneﬁt.”
(emphasis added)).
123. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (noting,
in rejecting a takings claim, that New York City’s historical landmark designations were
“substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare”); id. at 145–46 (Rehnquist, J.,
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Procedural Impositions

Unlike the statutes discussed in the prior section, the legislation
reviewed in this section does not affect the standard employed to determine whether a regulation requires compensation or the defenses available
against such a claim. Instead, these statutes create costly procedural
requirements that preemptively aim to discourage the adoption of
regulations that might amount to takings in the ﬁrst place.
In several states, legislation requires local-government entities to
perform a “takings impact assessment” before deciding whether to adopt
a land-use regulation.124 While the details vary from state to state, such
assessments generally require the government to prepare, within a matter
of weeks, a written analysis responding to a series of what are, at times,
data-dependent questions respecting individual properties that would
potentially be subject to the regulation under consideration.125 These
statutes, again seen in their best light, aim to minimize interference with
property rights by forcing the government to prospectively consider the
future impacts of proposed regulations on property rights.126 In turn, the
dissenting) (“Appellees are not prohibiting a nuisance. The record is clear that the
proposed addition . . . would be in full compliance with zoning, height limitations, and
other health and safety requirements. Instead, appellees are seeking to preserve what they
believe to be an outstanding example of beaux arts architecture.”).
124. See Idaho Code § 67-8003 (2020) (requiring a takings impact assessment upon
written request of the private property owner); Tex. Gov’t Code § 2007.043 (2019)
(requiring a takings impact assessment only in select circumstances); Utah Code § 63L-3202 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.370 (2020). Other states passed legislation that
seemingly—and somewhat peculiarly, given the reality that so much of land-use regulation
occurs at the local level—only require state government entities to conduct takings impact
assessments. See Del. Code tit. 29, § 605 (2020); Ind. Code § 4-22-2-32 (2020); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 77-704 (West 2020); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 8056(1)(a), (6) (2020); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 24.424 (West 2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.017 (West 2020); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 2-10-105 (West 2019); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-09 (2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-1-203
(2020); Va. Code § 25.1-417 (2020); W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-1A-3 (LexisNexis 2020); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 9-5-303 (2020). Meanwhile, California, Colorado, and Nebraska did so by
following Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 15, 1988), which outlines
requirements for federal departments and agencies to follow when they act in a way
that might constitute a taking. Cal. Exec. Order No. D-77-89 (June 22, 1989), https://
www.library.ca.gov/Content/pdf/GovernmentPublications/executive-order-proclamation/
5949-5950.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2LX-HS5M]; Neb. Exec. Order No. 95-9 (June 3, 1998),
https://govdocs.nebraska.gov/docs/pilot/pubs/eoﬁles/95-9.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review); Gus Bauman, Supreme Court Takings Rule, SC43 ALI-ABA 91, 99 (1998).
Many takings impact assessment bills moved forward as political compromises after
diminution-in-value compensation bills did not garner sufficient support. See Robert Meltz,
Property Rights Legislation: Analysis and Update, SB14 ALI-ABA 551, 570 (1996).
125. See, e.g., Idaho Att’y Gen. Off., Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines 5 (2020),
https://www.ag.idaho.gov/content/uploads/2018/04/RegulatoryTakings.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q53Z-29P7] (noting that the completed takings analysis shall be provided no
more than forty-two days after a ﬁled request).
126. See, e.g., Marzulla, supra note 14, at 636 (“Planning bills merely require state
agencies to assess the takings implications of their regulations before they are adopted.”);
Michael M. Berger, Dollars and Damages: A Debate, Planning, Mar. 1996, at 22, 24 (“[W]hat
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argument goes, these assessments help the government avoid inadvertent
takings and protect the public ﬁsc.127 In other states, government entities
are encouraged and, in select instances, even required to engage in
settlement discussions upon property owners’ claims that a regulatory
action interferes with their preferred land uses.128
In the face of heightened ﬁscal pressures facing local governments,129
takings impact assessments and mandatory-settlement statutes may well
have the effect of chilling even those local regulatory efforts that are
extremely unlikely to broach the takings liability line.130 The cost of
completing takings impact assessments is extensive.131 An analysis of
Washington State’s takings impact assessment statute—which the state’s
voters repealed via referenda before it was implemented—estimated that
state and local entities would collectively sustain annual costs ranging
the pending legislation is designed to do is to force society to examine the true cost of its
programs . . . .”). Opponents, meanwhile, see an assessment statute as “red tape” that
demands expensive speculation that cannot achieve the stated aim, given the challenges
inherent in determining via a facial analysis the likelihood that a generally applicable law
will be unfair and unjust to an individual claimant absent compensation. See, e.g., Byrne,
Ten Arguments, supra note 87, at 137–38 (arguing that property assessment statutes have
little beneﬁt in terms of protecting property rights because agencies are not equipped to
“rationally consider whether a proposed regulation will effect a taking on any piece of
property”); Cordes, supra note 14, at 241 (“[I]t is questionable whether the marginal
beneﬁts of such assessments will be worth the considerable effort of their preparation.”);
Marilyn F. Drees, Do State Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the “Just Compensation”
Dilemma? Some Lessons from Public Choice and Positive Political Theory, 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 787, 814 n.168 (1997) (arguing that assessment requirements that rely on facial
assessments are unlikely to “weed out a great number of regulations” because they cannot
show harm to every affected person); Freilich & Doyle, supra note 14, at 4–6 (“[A]ssessment
type takings laws could not accomplish anything more than creating a huge expense and
chilling the efforts of state agencies and local governments charged to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of our communities.” (footnotes omitted)).
127. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the
Property Rights Movement, 1 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 77, 120–21 (2002) (“[Takings impact
assessment] statutes are broadly beneﬁcial in the sense that they force agencies and
attorneys general to give at least some thought to property rights and the takings issue.”).
128. See Fla. Stat. § 70.001(1), (4)(c) (2020) (requiring the government to “make a
written settlement offer” within a speciﬁed period following a property owner’s ﬁling a claim
that “a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance . . . unfairly affects real property”); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(3) (allowing a landowner to “apply for mediation” if the landowner
believes they have “suffered signiﬁcant harm as a result of a [local] governmental action
regulating land use” and have “pursued all reasonable avenues of administrative appeal”).
129. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Sugameli, supra note 14, at 573 (asserting that takings impact assessments
“can incur high costs in time, effort and expense and can function, intentionally or not, to
delay or block implementation of laws that protect people, property and communities”).
131. See S. Rep. No. 104-239, at 75 n.21 (1996) (“[T]he Congressional Budget Office
and the Office of Management and Budget have estimated the cost of this [takings impact
assessment] provision to be between $30 and $40 million over 5 years.”); Carol M. Rose, A
Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 265, 288 (1996) (“At best, such overblown procedural requirements
are simply wasteful . . . .”).
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from $513 million to $2.3 billion in 1994 dollars to fulﬁll their assessment
requirements.132
The costs of mandatory-settlement discussions can also be significant.
The government is at an “information asymmetry” in these discussions
given that it is required to engage with each property claimant about the
impact of a regulation on that claimant’s individual property—about which
likely only that claimant is intimately familiar—even where that regulation
applies generally to hundreds or even thousands of properties.133 Simply
arranging such individualized discussions is an administratively expensive
task,134 let alone the possibility of having to hire additional government
personnel to acquire the background information needed to conduct
these individualized discussions in any meaningfully thorough way.
C.

Limitations on Speciﬁc Local-Government Powers

The statutes in this section do not aim to chill land-use regulation
substantively or procedurally, but instead preempt or constrain the use of
speciﬁc local regulatory tools at the center of takings law outright. The
legislation in this category includes provisions respecting eminent
domain, lot-merger ordinances, development moratoria, impact fees,
tenant protections and other housing policies, environmental preservation, and zoning variances. Unsurprisingly, given the breadth of this
range, the motivations behind and rationalizations for adopting these
statutes vary considerably. In general, though, it is fair to suggest these
statutes are rooted in the implicit assumption that local governments are
wholly incapable of being channeled into making prudent, cost-conscious
choices in these areas.
1. Limitations on Eminent Domain Authority. — The ﬁrst category of
outright limitations on speciﬁc local-government powers involves eminent
domain. These statutes are intimately tied up with takings jurisprudence,
perhaps most notoriously after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City
of New London.135 In Kelo, the Court concluded that condemnation of nonblighted properties for economic redevelopment purposes is consistent
with the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” clause.136 This holding prompted
132. See Inst. for Pub. Pol’y & Mgmt., Univ. of Wash., Referendum 48—Economic
Impact Study of the Property Rights Initiative 5 tbl.1, 6 tbl.3 (1995) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review). In 2020 dollars, the cost would be approximately $892 million to $4 billion,
according to calculations from the Consumer Price Index Inﬂation Calculator of the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. See CPI Inﬂation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inﬂation_calculator.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
133. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida’s Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix
Results in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 389–91 (1995).
134. See id. at 388–89 (“[T]he land use entity must make a careful, individualized
determination for each claim ﬁled . . . . This personnel cost will have to be absorbed by the
agency, since administrative costs of the Act are not funded.”).
135. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
136. Id. at 484.
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dozens of state legislatures to pass statutes limiting eminent domain for
economic development purposes.137 In some of these states, the restrictions are limited in that they continue to allow the taking of properties
that ﬁt a broadly worded deﬁnition of “blighted.”138 In others, though, the
statutory measures are quite constraining. Some states partner their
prohibitions on economic development takings with a narrowing of the
deﬁnition of “blight”;139 others go so far as to prohibit economic
development takings regardless of blight.140
137. Among the plethora of law review articles recounting and assessing the state
legislative responses to Kelo, careful contributions include: Ely, supra note 14, at 133–38
(critically assessing post-Kelo statutes in light of expansive “blight” exemptions and “motive”
requirements); Jacobs & Bassett, supra note 14, at 6–8 (arguing that state laws passed in
response to Kelo have had little substantive impact, but may have heightened public
awareness of takings); Mihaly & Smith, supra note 14, at 726–27 (noting, at the time of
writing, that out of the forty states that enacted post-Kelo legislation, only fourteen state
legislatures enacted laws that either banned or signiﬁcantly restricted condemnation for
economic development); Morriss, supra note 14, at 240–43 (offering explanations for the
differing effectiveness of post-Kelo statues); Somin, Political Response to Kelo, supra note 14,
at 2114–16 (categorizing post-Kelo legislative efforts as either effective or ineffective);
Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings
Initiatives, 116 Yale L.J. 1518, 1522–27 (2007) (surveying the regulatory takings reform
movement and its success at the state level).
138. See Alaska Stat. §§ 09.55.240(a)(2), 18.55.950(2) (2020); Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 33030–33037 (2020); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-25-103(2), 38-1-101(2)(b) (2020); 65
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5 / 11-74.4-3(a)(1) (West 2019); Iowa Code § 6A.22 (2020); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 99.340(2), 99.370(6) (West 2020); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 816 (2020); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 5101 (2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 100.310.2, 353.020.2, 523.271.2
(West 2020); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4206(2), 70-30-102 (West 2019); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 18-2103 (2012), 76-701 (2018); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 37.010(1)(o), 279.388 (2019); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-503(2), 160A-515 (2020); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.08(B)(2)(a)-(p),
303.26(E) (2007); 42 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-64.12-6(d) (2020); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-31-6
(2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201(a) (2020); Tex. Gov’t Code § 2206.001(b)(3) (2019);
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 374.003(3) (2019); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1040 (2020); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 24, § 3201(3) (2019); W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 16-18-3(c)–(d), 16-18-6 (LexisNexis 2020);
Wis. Stat. § 32.03(6)(a) (2020). Maryland law allows economic development and blight
takings but requires that they be accomplished within four years of their authorization. See
Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 12-105.1(a) (West 2020). Connecticut places a different
though similarly limited constraint on the exercise of eminent domain by precluding its use
in instances in which the condemnation would be “for the primary purpose of increasing
local tax revenue.” See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-193(b)(1) (2020).
139. See Ala. Code § 24-2-2(c) (2020); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1-1(1), (10) (2020); Idaho
Code § 7-701A(2)(b) (2020); Ind. Code § 32-24-4.5-7 (2020); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 213.23(1), (3), (8) (West 2020); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205:3-b (2020); Va. Code § 1-219.1
(2020); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-801(c) (2020). The Pennsylvania legislature precluded economic
development takings with a narrow deﬁnition of blight but included geographic exemptions
for major urban areas. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 203(b)(4), 204(a), 205(b)–(c) (2018).
140. See Fla. Stat. § 73.013(1), (4) (2020); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-18-10 (West 2020). These
statutes largely mirror a Utah statute that had been enacted shortly before the Supreme
Court released its decision in Kelo. See S.B. 184, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005) (repealed
by H.B. 365, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006)). Two other state legislatures have gone
nearly as far. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 26-501b (2020) (precluding nearly all exercises of
eminent domain that would be followed by a transfer to a nongovernmental third party);
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2. Anti-Lot-Merger Laws. — The power to deﬁne lot-line boundaries is
a second area of state intervention in speciﬁc local-government authority.
In the recent Supreme Court case Murr v. Wisconsin, a landowner
challenged a county regulation requiring the merger of commonly owned
adjacent properties that, separately, are not sufficiently large under
current zoning law to erect residential structures in light of ﬂooding and
other topographical risks.141 Consistent with the lower courts that had
addressed earlier takings challenges to merger laws,142 the Court
unanimously agreed that the county’s merger ordinance did not amount
to a compensable taking of the claimant’s property.143
Shortly after the Murr decision came down in 2017, the Wisconsin
legislature passed a statute—effective retroactively—that preempts any law
that requires lots to be merged without the owners’ consent.144 This course
followed that of several state legislatures that had restricted local use of
merger laws prior to Murr. Several of these pre-Murr antimerger laws
directly mirror Wisconsin’s statute in important respects.145 Of the others,
one state’s statute limits mergers to those instances involving local efforts
to enforce setback requirements and subdivision standards,146 while
several other states place similar, if less stringent, constraints on the
application of merger laws.147
S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 11-7-22.1(1) (2020) (precluding economic development takings and
all takings—including in blighted areas—that would be followed by a transfer of the
condemned interest to a nongovernmental third party).
141. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017).
142. See, e.g., Booth v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., Barrington, No. PC97-3515, 1999 WL
566128, at *6–7 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 14, 1999); Mancino v. Purcell, No. 95-6007, 1997 WL
1051036, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1997).
143. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–49; id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that
the majority’s conclusion that the merger ordinance did not affect a compensable taking
“d[id] not trouble [him]”). The Justices were divided, though, on the appropriate approach
for determining the baseline property interest at stake in a regulatory takings case. See
Mulvaney, Property-As-Society, supra note 106, at 964–66.
144. Wis. Stat. § 66.10015(4) (2020).
145. New Hampshire’s statute most directly mirrors that of Wisconsin. See N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 674:39-a (2020) (“No city, town, county, or village district may merge preexisting
subdivided lots or parcels except upon the consent of the owner.”). In Colorado, counties
considering a merger of lots must afford the landowner the opportunity to request a hearing.
Landowner consent is required for the merger to proceed only if the landlord requests a
hearing. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-28-139(1)–(2) (2020). In effect, then, in all cases in Wisconsin
and New Hampshire, the owner must give the government consent, whereas in Colorado, the
owner must take the step of requesting a hearing to place that burden on the government.
146. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-6-9.1 (West 2020) (precluding counties from merging parcels
considered separate in the chains of title prior to transfer into common ownership and
where the common owner has “taken no action to consolidate the parcels” except “for the
purpose of enforcing minimum zoning or subdivision standards”).
147. Cal. Gov’t Code § 66451.10–11 (2020) (precluding the application of local merger
laws unless some combination of conditions relating to existing development, lot size,
sewage and water service, slope stability, vehicular and safety equipment access, health and
safety hazards, and comprehensive plan consistency are satisﬁed); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.
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3. Development Moratoria Preemption. — Local governments at times
impose moratoria on development in order to facilitate planning. By
temporarily limiting growth, development moratoria provide officials with
time and space to address their jurisdiction’s myriad community goals—
such as safeguarding sites of historic and cultural value, preserving open
space and other environmental resources, and providing affordable
housing—in a more coordinated and comprehensive fashion than they
otherwise could.148
The Supreme Court has determined that adjudicating takings
challenges to these moratoria “requires careful examination and weighing
of all the relevant circumstances” via the “Penn Central inquiry.”149
Development moratoria, like merger ordinances, have consistently
survived constitutional challenge under this standard.150 Many state
legislatures, however, have capped the length of time that local
governments may adopt development moratoria to periods as short as four
months.151
§ 45-24-38 (2020) (requiring that the standards employed at the local level to determine
whether a merger is appropriate must allow for consideration of infrastructure availability,
neighborhood character, and comprehensive plan consistency); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24,
§ 4412(2)(B) (2020) (precluding the application of municipal merger laws where “the lots
are conveyed in their preexisting, nonconforming conﬁguration” and, prior to the effective
date of the merger law, each lot was connected to an operable water supply and wastewater
system). One state legislature uniquely constrains county government authority to adopt
and apply merger laws by setting out criteria for those contiguous “shoreland” lots that local
governments must merge. See Minn. Stat. § 394.36 (2019).
148. Robert Meltz, Dwight H. Merriam & Richard M. Frank, The Takings Issue:
Constitutional Limits on Land Use Control and Environmental Regulation 264–65 (1999).
149. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 n.23,
334 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). While the Supreme Court determined in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles that the state cannot
avoid having to pay compensation by repealing the offending law, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987),
the California courts held on remand that an interim local ordinance precluding
construction in a ﬂood-prone area did not amount to a compensable “temporary” taking,
First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr.
893, 906 (Ct. App. 1989). In Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court later rejected a claimant’s
contention that a thirty-two-month development moratorium should be deemed a taking of
all economically viable uses regardless of any public interests advanced by the moratorium.
See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320–21.
150. See, e.g., Wild Rice River Ests., Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d 850, 859 (N.D.
2005); Nolen v. Newtown Twp., 854 A.2d 705, 709–10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
151. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-833(E) (2020) (120-day limit with one possible renewal);
Cal. Gov’t. Code § 65858(a) (forty-ﬁve-day limit with up to a two-year extension); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 30-28-121 (2020) (six months); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.201(1) (West 2020) (one
year); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 4356(2) (2020) (180-day limit with one possible
renewal); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 125.3404 (West 2020) (one-year limit with one possible
renewal); Minn. Stat. § 394.34 (one-year limit with a possible two-year renewal); Mont. Code
Ann. § 76-2-206(2) (West 2019) (one-year limit with one possible renewal); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 674:23(III)(c) (2020) (one year); Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.520(4) (2019) (120-day limit
with up to a possible six-month renewal); S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 11-2-10 (2020) (one-year limit
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4. Impact-Fee Limitations. — Fees by local governments assessed to
mitigate the impact of development constitute another area of state
interference. Takings jurisprudence somewhat peculiarly saddles the
government, as the defendant in takings cases, with the burden of proving
that certain types of permit conditions are sufficiently connected to and
roughly proportionate with the anticipated impacts stemming from the
approved development to avoid liability.152 In turn, though, this means
that in those many routine instances in which this burden either is met or
is considered inapplicable to the type of permit condition at issue, takings
liability is inapposite.153 One approach to offset development impacts—
particularly those that are cumulative in nature, such as stresses on local
schools, roadways, and traffic patterns—involves conditioning development
permits on the requirement that the applicant pay impact or “linkage” fees
that the local government pools.154
Some state legislatures, however, have precluded impact fees outright
in certain circumstances,155 and many others have placed stringent
limitations on their use even in cases in which the government would have
little difficulty demonstrating that the fees meet the connectivity and
proportionality strictures of takings law were it required to do so.156
with one possible renewal); Utah Code § 10-9a-504 (2005) (six-month limit with a possible
eighteen-month renewal); Wash. Rev. Code § 35A.63.220 (2020) (six-month limit with
possible unlimited renewals); Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(da) (2020) (two-year limit with a possible
one-year renewal). New Jersey precludes development moratoria for the purpose of
preparing a comprehensive plan or drafting development regulations, though they are
authorized for up to six months “where the municipality demonstrates on the basis of a
written opinion by a qualiﬁed health professional that a clear imminent danger to the health
of the inhabitants of the municipality exists.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-90(b) (West 2020).
152. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“rough proportionality”);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“essential nexus”).
153. There is general agreement that the nexus and proportionality standards apply
when the state issues or proposes a land-use permit administratively conditioned on
applicants providing strangers permanent access to their land or drawing on a “speciﬁc
pool” of the applicants’ money. The lower courts are divided, however, on the question of
whether these standards apply in the various other contexts involving conditional permits
(situations in which permit conditions are unrelated to access by strangers or a speciﬁc pool
of funds, situations in which permit conditions are required by broadly applicable
regulation, etc.). For a recent exploration of the topic of when courts apply the heightened
scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan and how restraint in its application stems from normative
concerns regarding fair allocation, see generally Timothy M. Mulvaney, The State of
Exactions, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 169 (2019) [hereinafter Mulvaney, State of Exactions].
154. See William W. Merrill III & Robert K. Lincoln, Linkage Fees and Fair Share
Regulations: Law and Method, 25 Urb. Law. 223, 234–37 (1993) (explaining how linkage
fees are formulated to be proportional to the development’s impact).
155. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-463.05(B)(5) (prohibiting development fees for
construction or repair for public facilities and associated operation costs); Del. Code tit. 14,
§ 2006(b) (2020) (precluding impact fees for improving water supply or wastewater
capacity); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-8-5 (West 2020) (prohibiting impact fees for construction or
repair of public facilities, operating costs of a municipality, and debt payments).
156. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-463.05(A) (allowing municipalities to assess development
fees to offset costs for necessary public services); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-103(b) (2020)
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5. Preemption of Tenant Protections and Other Local Housing Policies. —
Rent control and related tenant protections have often survived takings
challenges where they assure landlords a reasonable rate of return on their
investment under the circumstances. A century ago, in Block v. Hirsh, the
Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge to a law that, in the face of a
housing shortage, allowed tenants to retain possession of their units after
the end of their leases at rents determined by a government commission.157
The Court reaffirmed Block seventy years later in holding that a law
allowing mobile home owners to continue renting the land on which their
mobile homes sat after the termination of the lease term did not amount
to a categorically compensable regulation authorizing an unwanted
physical invasion by a stranger.158 Consequently, lower courts almost

(allowing municipalities to assess impact fees to offset costs for necessary public facilities);
Cal. Gov’t Code § 66001 (establishing requirements for any imposed development fee by a
local agency); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-20-104(2)(c) (allowing a local government to impose an
impact fee); Del. Code tit. 29, § 9124 (allowing a county government to establish an impact
fee for services for which the county will bear increased costs of development); Fla. Stat.
§ 163.31801 (2020) (establishing minimum requirements for impact fees by a municipality);
Ga. Code Ann. § 36-71-3 (2020) (authorizing municipalities and counties to impose
development impact fees); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-142 (2020) (allowing impact fees to be
assessed); Idaho Code § 67-8204 (2020) (allowing government entities to impose
development impact fees as a condition of development); 605 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-904
(West 2020) (establishing requirements for any impact fee by a local government); Ind.
Code § 36-7-4-1311 (2020) (allowing local units to impose an impact fee); La. Stat. Ann.
§ 33:3091 (2019) (establishing requirements for impact fees); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-a,
§ 4354 (establishing requirements for impact fees); Md. Code Ann., Loc. Gov’t § 5-102
(West 2020) (requiring that impact fees have a “rational nexus” to the project); Mont. Code
Ann. § 7-6-1602 (establishing requirements for impact fees); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 278B.160
(2019) (allowing a local government to impose an impact fee); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 674:21
(requiring an impact fee to be proportional to the improvement costs); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-3 (prohibiting municipalities or counties from enacting impact fees unless speciﬁcally
authorized); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162A-203 (2020) (establishing limits on impact fees); Okla.
Stat. tit. 62, § 895 (2020) (limiting development fees to public infrastructure expansion);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.302 (authorizing “system development charges”); 53 Pa. Stat. § 10503A (West 2020) (authorizing only transportation fees); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-22.4-3 (2020)
(establishing requirements for impact fees); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-2902 (2020) (allowing
funding for schools in high growth areas by taxing residential developments); Tex. Loc.
Gov’t Code § 395.011–395.012 (2019) (prohibiting government entities from imposing
impact fee unless speciﬁcally authorized); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, §§ 5200, 5202, 5204 (2020)
(limiting impact fees to the “proportionate share” of a development’s cost); Va. Code § 15.22319 (2020) (allowing localities to impose impact fees for the cost of reasonable road
improvements); Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.060 (establishing requirements for impact fees);
W. Va. Code Ann. § 7-20-7 (LexisNexis 2020) (limiting impact fees to the “proportionate
share” of any realized beneﬁt); Wis. Stat. § 66.0617 (allowing a municipality to impose an
impact fee to pay for necessary land development costs). Select states require takings impact
assessments—described above in the context of generally applicable regulations—before
conditioning a permit on the dedication of a property interest. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 24.424; Utah Code § 11-36a-201 to -202.
157. 256 U.S. 135, 157–58 (1921).
158. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 539 (1992).
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universally reject Penn Central claims in this context.159 But at least twentynine states preempt rent control ordinances.160 Relatedly, in two states,
state legislatures have preempted local governments from enacting
ordinances that preclude landlords from discriminating against prospective tenants on the grounds that they hold government-provided
housing vouchers.161
In this same vein, some local governments have sought to combat
housing-affordability crises by turning to inclusionary zoning ordinances.
These ordinances condition residential development permits on applicants ensuring that permitted development will include a share of units
that are affordable for low-income families.162 The lower courts have
rejected takings challenges to such ordinances,163 and the Supreme Court
has denied numerous petitions for writs of certiorari raising the issue.164 A
number of state legislatures, however, have precluded local governments

159. See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010); Yee
v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557–58 (Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 503 U.S. 519; Heyert
v. Taddese, 70 A.3d 680, 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
160. Ala. Code § 11-80-8.1 (2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-461.16; Ark. Code Ann. § 14-16601; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-12-301; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-148b (2020); Fla. Stat. § 125.0103; Ga.
Code Ann. § 44-7-19; Idaho Code § 55-307; 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 825/5 (West 2020); Ind.
Code § 32-31-1-20; Iowa Code § 331.304 (2020); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,120 (West 2020);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.875 (West 2020); La. Stat. Ann. § 9:3258; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
40P, § 4 (West 2020); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.411; Minn. Stat. § 471.9996 (2019);
Miss. Code. Ann. § 21-17-5 (2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 441.043 (West 2020); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 42-14.1; N.D. Cent. Code § 47-16-02.1 (2020); Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 14-101.1 (2020); S.C.
Code Ann. § 27-39-60 (West 2020); S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 6-1-13 (2020); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 66-35-102; Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.902; Utah Code § 57-20-1 (2006); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 35.21.830; Wis. Stat. § 66.1015 (2020).
161. Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8.5; Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 250.007.
162. For a helpful national survey of such ordinances, see generally Emily Thaden &
Ruoniu Wang, Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Prevalence, Impact, and Practices
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP17ET1, 2017), https://www.lincolninst.edu/
sites/default/ﬁles/pubﬁles/thaden_wp17et1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWL6-EFLT].
163. See, e.g., 2910 Ga. Ave. LLC v. District of Columbia, 234 F. Supp. 3d 281, 294
(D.D.C. 2017); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979 (Cal. 2015);
Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 61–62 (Ct. App. 2001). Questions
as to which takings standards apply to inclusionary housing programs and whether such
programs violate those standards remain the subject of ﬁerce debate within academic
literature. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable
Housing Mandates, in Evidence and Innovation in Housing Law and Policy 64, 66 (Lee
Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017) (contending that inclusionary housing
programs amount to compensable takings), with Audrey G. McFarlane & Randall K.
Johnson, Cities, Inclusion and Exactions, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 2145, 2180–84 (2017) (asserting
that inclusionary housing ordinances should survive challenges under both Penn Central and
Nollan/Dolan).
164. Most recently, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Cherk
v. County of Marin, allowing to stand a California appellate court decision rejecting a claim
that an inclusionary housing program amounted to an unconstitutional condition. See No.
A153579, 2018 WL 6583442, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).
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from adopting mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances, regardless of
the circumstances.165
6. Precluding Environmental Protection. — By and large, environmental
laws have survived takings challenges outside the incredibly rare instance
in which a law deprives the claimant’s property of all economic value.166 A
number of states, though, have precluded local governments from seeking
to prevent environmental degradation via land-use regulation in the

165. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-461.16; Fla. Stat. § 163.31771; Ind. Code § 36-1-24.2-1;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-35-102(b); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.905; Wis. Stat.
§ 66.1015(3). One state follows the same course, though only with respect to manufactured
homes. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-1604. In other states, legislation limits local discretion
in designing voluntary inclusionary housing policies. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
40B, §§ 20–23 (West 2020); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws 45-24-46.1 (2020). Inclusionary zoning
ordinances also have been invalidated by courts as inconsistent with the states’ prohibitions
on rent control. See, e.g., Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C. v. Town of Telluride, 976 P.2d
303, 307 (Colo. App. 1998), aff’d, 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000); Apt. Ass’n of S. Cent. Wis., Inc. v.
City of Madison, 722 N.W.2d 614, 625 (Wis. App. 2006). In other states, state legislation
limits exclusionary zoning practices at the local level. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 65580–
65589.9 (2020); Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.005 to .850 (2019).
166. The Supreme Court recently concluded that a “reasonable land-use regulation[]
enacted . . . to preserve the river and surrounding land” does not “work a taking” under the
Penn Central framework. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1947–50 (2017). Lower court
cases rejecting regulatory takings challenges to environmental regulations abound. See, e.g.,
Wyer v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 2000) (denial of variance under sand
dune laws); Neifert v. Dep’t of Env’t, 910 A.2d 1100, 1114 (Md. 2006) (denial of sewer
service and wetland ﬁll permits); Erb v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 676 A.2d 1017, 1027 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996) (denial of permit for septic system); Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of
Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1390 (N.J. 1992) (ordinance limiting quarry operations); Save
the Pine Bush v. Albany, 530 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (environmental review
of minimum preserve acreage); Milardo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt., 434 A.2d 266, 268 (R.I. 1981)
(denial of permit for sewage system construction); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 530
S.E.2d 628, 634–35 (S.C. 2000) (denial of permits to bulkhead and ﬁll lots).

254

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:215

context of pesticides,167 factory farms,168 oil and gas operations,169 plastic
bags,170 and, in one state, Styrofoam.171
7. Limiting Land-Use Variances. — A ﬁnal area of state reordering to
note in this category of state statutes involves local discretion in applying
the strict terms of zoning codes. No court has found a taking based on the
nonenforcement of an existing regulation against a third party, and most
courts that have addressed such claims have rejected them summarily.172
Some state legislatures, however, have limited the circumstances in which
local governments can grant waivers from generally applicable land-use
controls and thus, the extent to which local governments can inject
ﬂexibility into their regulatory regimes.173
167. See Ala. Code § 2-27-5.1 (2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 3-349; Ark. Code Ann. § 20-20266; Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 11501.1 (2020); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 35-10-112(3) (2020); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 22a-54 (2020); Del. Code tit. 3, § 1203 (2020); Fla. Stat. § 482.242; Ga. Code
Ann. § 2-7-113.1 (2020); Idaho Code § 22-3426 (2020); 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 60/3 (West
2020); Ind. Code § 15-16-5-71; Iowa Code § 206.34 (2020); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 2-2480 (West
2020); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 217b.270 (West 2020); La. Stat. Ann. § 3:3224 (2020); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 132b, § 1 (West 2020); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.8328 (West 2020); Minn.
Stat. § 18b.02 (2019); Miss. Code Ann. § 69-23-9 (2020); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 281.005 (West
2020); Mont. Code Ann. § 80-8-120 (West 2019); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-2625 (2012); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 430:49 (2020); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 76-4-9.1 (2020); N.Y. Env’t Conserv. Law § 330303(1) (McKinney 2020); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-435 (2020); N.D. Cent. Code § 4.1-3406 (2020); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 921.02 (2020); Okla. Stat. tit. 2, § 3-84 (2019); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 634.057; 3 Pa. Stat. § 111.57 (West 2020); 23 R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-25-9 (2020); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 46-13-30 (2020); S.D. Codified Laws § 39-1-17 (2020); Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-8-114; Tex.
Agric. Code Ann. § 76.003 (2019); Va. Code § 3.2-3907 (2016); Wash. Rev. Code § 17.21.010
(2020); W. Va. Code Ann. § 19-16a-2 (LexisNexis 2020); Wis. Stat. § 94.701; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 357-352 (2020).
168. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 580.0365; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,137; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 413.072; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.538; 3 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 313 (2020); S.D. Codiﬁed
Laws § 39-1-17; Township of Franklin v. Hollander, 769 A.2d 427 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
2001), aff’d, 796 A.2d 874, 878 (N.J. 2002).
169. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 119-55; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2019); Tex. Nat.
Res. Code § 81.0523 (2019).
170. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 9-500.38, 11-269.16; Del. Code tit. 7, § 6099A (2020); Fla.
Stat. § 403.7033; Idaho Code § 67-2340; Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8.6; Iowa Code § 331.301(6)(c);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.592; Minn. Stat. § 471.9998; Miss. Code Ann. § 17-1-73; Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 260.283; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.0961 (2019); Wis. Stat.
§ 66.0419.
171. Fla. Stat. § 500.90.
172. See Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra note 61, at 161–64.
173. In some instances, these statutes operate to constrain local governments in the
sense that they appear to have been adopted out of concern that variances otherwise would
be granted too generously at the local level. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-70 (2020)
(declaring that no variance may be granted “without a showing that such variance or other
relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not
substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance”).
In others, though, these statutes may have been enacted to ensure that local governments
do not adopt what in the state legislature’s mind is an unduly narrow deﬁnition of the
contexts within which a variance is appropriate. See, e.g., Tex. Agric. Code Ann. § 201.133
(authorizing “variance[s] from the land-use regulations that will: (1) relieve the great
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D. Property Owner Empowerments
The statutes in this section do not directly restrict the exercise of local
regulatory authority but instead have the same effect by empowering
landowners to resist local authority in historic landmark designations,
development approvals, and permitting.
1. Historic Preservation. — Many local ordinances identify
neighborhoods as composed of structures that are of architectural or
other historic signiﬁcance.174 Structures within these districts are subject
to design guidelines that check construction activities to ensure that they
do not unduly interfere with the neighborhood’s historic integrity.175
Constitutional takings challenges to such broadly applicable historic
district designations have found little success.176
Local governments have had slightly more difficulty justifying
impositions on owners of structures individually deemed historic
landmarks given that such impositions are less likely to offer the reciprocal
advantages experienced by property owners within historic districts.177
Still, the imposition on the owner of landmarked property may not be
particularly severe—the owner’s current use may continue (so only a
potential opportunity is lost), limitations generally “apply only to the
structure’s exterior,” and “the land and structure remain marketable.”178
For these reasons, even many historic landmark designations have survived
regulatory takings review.179
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships; (2) not be contrary to the public interest; (3)
observe the spirit of the land-use regulations; (4) secure the public health, safety, and
welfare; and (5) do substantial justice”). In this sense, while a large bulk of the state statutes
constraining or preempting local-government authority seem aligned with the perspective
of those who advance a broader view of takings liability than the courts have offered, the
former class of variance statutes serves as an illustration of state legislatures’ moving to
prevent local governments from regulating property in a manner that is perhaps too friendly
to conventional takings claimants.
174. See Christopher D. Bowers, Historic Preservation Law Concerning Private
Property, 30 Urb. Law. 405, 407 (1998) (noting how “local governments in almost every
state regulate historic properties”).
175. See Robert J. Sitkowski & Brian W. Ohm, Form-Based Land Development
Regulations, 38 Urb. Law. 163, 170 (2006) (describing how many localities have tried to use
a “design guidelines” regime to balance between discretion and prescription).
176. See J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws
After Penn Central, 15 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 313, 332–34 (2004) (describing how statutory
hardship exceptions have made such claims difficult to litigate).
177. See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 888 (D. Md. 1996)
(ﬁnding a compensable taking where the city refused to issue a certiﬁcate of
appropriateness to a monastery seeking to demolish one of its buildings even though it
conceded that there was no economically viable plan to preserve the building).
178. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, supra note 61, at 161.
179. See, e.g., Van Horn v. Town of Castine, 167 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105–06 (D. Me. 2001);
Casey v. Mayor of Rockville, 929 A.2d 74, 108 (Md. 2007); State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson,
285 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1979); United Artists’ Theater Cir., Inc. v. City of
Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. 1993); Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Pa. Hist. & Museum
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Despite all this, several states have enacted statutes requiring that local
governments allow property owners to refuse designation of their
properties as historic.180 Some statutes even mandate that local
governments allow the removal of prior historic designations.181
2. Permitting Delays. — The Supreme Court has sought to distinguish
normal delays in the land-use permitting process, which do not implicate
takings protections, from extraordinary delays that might.182 One state
supreme court described takings liability as potentially appropriate only
when the government’s silence on a permit application is “so unreasonable
from a legal standpoint as to lead to the conclusion that it was taken for
no purpose other than to delay the development project before it.”183 In
many states, however, state legislation categorically provides for the
automatic approval of subdivision and related development applications if
the local regulatory authority does not act on that application within a
deﬁned period, regardless of the circumstances.184
Comm’n, 628 A.2d 498, 502 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); 2218 Bryan St., Ltd. v. City of Dallas,
175 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Tex. App. 2005).
180. See, e.g., Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 211.0165 (2019) (requiring that local governments
obtain the owner’s consent to landmark that owner’s property as one of historic significance).
181. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.772 (2019) (authorizing owners to refuse to consent
to historic designations or to remove the imposition of such designations).
182. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (limiting the holding that a temporary restriction may constitute
a taking by stating that the court “do[es] not deal with the quite different question that
would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning
ordinances, variances, and the like”).
183. Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Cal. 1998); see also
Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that, in the temporary
takings context, “[a] combination of extraordinary delay and intimated bad faith, under the
third prong of the Penn Central analysis, inﬂuence the character of the governmental
action”); Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 87 (Ct. App. 2002)
(explaining the relevance of the fact that the city’s action was not taken “solely to delay the
proposed project”).
184. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-52-32 (2020) (“[T]he municipal planning commission
shall approve or disapprove a plat within 30 days after the submission thereof to it;
otherwise, the plat shall be deemed to have been approved . . . .”); Alaska Stat. § 29.40.110
(2020) (providing sixty days for plat approvals); Cal. Gov’t Code § 65952 (2020) (providing
180 days for “lead” agencies and ninety days for “responsible,” or nonlead, agencies for
most “development project[]” approvals, but not for rezoning requests); Del. Code tit. 9,
§ 4811 (2020) (providing forty-ﬁve days for plat approvals); 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1112-8 (West 2020) (providing ninety days for preliminary plat approvals and sixty days for
ﬁnal plat approvals); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-752 (West 2020) (providing sixty days for
subdivision plats); La. Stat. Ann. § 33:113 (West 2019) (providing sixty days for subdivision
plats); Md. Code Ann., Land Use § 5-201 (West 2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision
plats); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 81U (West 2020) (providing forty-ﬁve days for a health
board decision on subdivision plats and, thereafter, 135 days for a planning commission
decision); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 560.109 (West 2019) (providing forty-ﬁve days for
preliminary plat approvals and sixty days for ﬁnal plat approvals); Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2020)
(providing sixty days for zoning and septic system decisions); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 89.420 (West
2020) (providing sixty days for subdivision plats); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:27-6.7 (West 2020)
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3. Mandatory Permit Approvals. — While there remains some
uncertainty in this regard, takings jurisprudence seems to suggest that a
proposed land-use permit condition that is not appropriately connected
or proportional to the permitted development’s impacts is to be enjoined.185
It is conceivable that a court could require the payment of compensation
for the interim period during which such an unconstitutional condition was
in force.186 But no court has asserted that a claimant who successfully
challenges a land-use permit condition as unconstitutional is also entitled
to issuance of an unconditional permit; instead, the decision has been left
to local governments to determine whether to issue new conditional
permits that survive the nexus and proportionality strictures.187
In some states, however, legislation authorizes property owners to
proceed with development while simultaneously seeking compensation
via a challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional condition attached to

(requiring county approval for a site plan or development permit and specifying that towns
must submit to the county planning board for review, and that the board has thirty days to
report back before it is deemed to have approved the submission); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-20-7
(West 2020) (providing thirty-ﬁve days for plat approvals); N.Y. Town Law § 276 (McKinney
2020) (providing sixty-two days for preliminary plat approvals and sixty-two days for ﬁnal
plat approvals); N.D. Cent. Code § 40-48-21 (2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision
plats); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 711.05 (2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision plats);
Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 47-115 (2020) (providing thirty days for subdivision plats); 53 Pa. Stat.
§ 10508 (West 2020) (providing ninety days for subdivision plats); 45 R.I. Gen. Laws § 4523-37 (2020) (providing ﬁfteen days for administrative review of a subdivision application
and, thereafter, sixty-ﬁve days for a planning board decision); S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 11-2-24.1
(2020) (providing sixty-ﬁve days for subdivision plats); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-304 (2020)
(providing sixty days for plats); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 212.009 (providing thirty days for
plat approvals); Wis. Stat. § 236.11 (2020) (providing ninety days for preliminary plat
approvals and sixty days for ﬁnal plat approvals); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-307 (2020)
(providing forty-ﬁve days following the due date for the department of environmental
quality’s review). Two commentators have queried whether the reality that automatic
approval statutes eliminate the opportunity for neighbors to express opposition to the
approval raises due process concerns. See Gregory G. Booker & Karen R. Cole, Automatic
Approval Statutes: Escape Hatches and Pitfalls, 29 Urb. Law. 439, 470 (1997).
185. See Mulvaney, State of Exactions, supra note 153, at 211 (“Interestingly,
the Koontz dissenters asserted that they agreed with the majority that a condition violative
of Nollan and Dolan should be enjoined, even though the majority reached no such explicit
conclusion.”).
186. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396, 398 n.2 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2014) (“The fact that the government has the ‘greater authority’ to deny a permit
does not imply the ‘lesser power to condition permit approval on petitioner’s forfeiture of
his constitutional rights.’” (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S.
595, 608 (2013))).
187. See Cheatham v. City of Hartselle, No. CV-14-J-397-NE, 2015 WL 897583, at *4–5
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2015); Levin v. City & County of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1088–
89 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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their development permits.188 In these jurisdictions, then, landowners can
potentially both reap compensation and obtain an unconditioned permit.
*

*

*

Land uses are interdependent in the sense that they necessarily and
directly—if at times only cumulatively—impact others’ land uses in both
positive and negative ways. It is not possible, therefore, to protect the
wishes or expectations of everyone with a plausible claim to a property
interest in land.189 Government entities must make choices among
conﬂicting property claims. These choices confer power on one party over
others and, thereby, expose these others’ vulnerabilities.190 In theory, the
government has a suite of regulatory tools at its disposal to execute choices
among the competing interests at the heart of such conﬂicts. State
legislatures have, however, preempted or constricted the local deployment
of many tools tied to takings law, often without contextualized justiﬁcation.
State legislatures no doubt have general authority to adopt preemptive and
constrictive measures.191 But that such authority exists is a separate issue
from the ramiﬁcations of the sheer breadth of measures that have been
adopted with little effort on the states’ part to justify them.
When state legislatures preempt or constrict the deployment of
regulatory tools that local governments rely on to balance competing
property claims, the states are not merely shielding property owners from
purportedly unfair burdens; they are also assuming responsibility for making
choices among competing property claimants themselves. In assuming this
188. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-20-204 (2020) (“An owner may proceed with
development without prejudice to that owner’s right to pursue the remedy provided by this
section.”).
189. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 13 (1928)
(contending that “dominion over things” necessarily impedes the interests of other people);
Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking Property Seriously, in 11 Property Rights and Sustainability: The
Evolution of Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges 43, 50 (David Grinlinton & Prue
Taylor eds., 2011) (asserting that property is an evolving social institution that involves the
calibration and recalibration of private interests over time); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund,
Property: A Special Right, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (1996) [hereinafter
Underkuffler-Freund, A Special Right] (arguing that protecting a property interest for one
person “necessarily and inevitably” denies that same interest to someone else).
190. See Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, 12 J. Env’t L. & Litig. 43,
44 (1997) (describing property as an “ongoing ﬁght[] about who gets what, why, and how
much”); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1991)
(“The grant of a property right to one person leaves others vulnerable to the will of the
owner. Conversely, the refusal to grant a property right leaves the claimant vulnerable to
the will of others . . . .”); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property,
9 Canadian J.L. & Juris. 161, 202–03 (1996) (“Property’s function, as a social and
governmental institution, is the resolution of conﬂicting claims, visions, values, and
histories. In this process, some individuals win, and others lose; the protection of some is,
inevitably, sacriﬁced for the protection of others.”).
191. See Richard Briffault & Laurie Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local
Government Law 432–93 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing state preemption authority).
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responsibility, the states could very well utilize the tools they are preventing
or constraining local governments from deploying. In select instances,
states have done just that; for instance, some state legislatures have passed
statutes declaring when neighboring lots must be merged.192 In most cases,
though, states are deciding not to utilize these tools.
These decisions are not neutral stances by state legislatures to protect
from local interference a set of property interests that all naturally and
concurrently enjoy.193 Rather, decisions mediating rivalrous rights to
property necessarily set out the interests some have at the expense of the
claimed interests of others.194 It follows that, through state legislatures’ use
of—or, perhaps more often, choice not to use—the land-use regulatory
tools that they are preventing local governments from deploying, states are
deciding between competing alleged property rights. While conﬂicting
property claims reﬂect the values that underlie both the conﬂicts and the
solution to those conﬂicts, the takings-related state statutes described here
resolve such conﬂicts in rigid, unmediated ways.
This squarely raises normative and practical questions as to the
respective roles that states and local governments should be playing in
resolving the difficult tradeoffs inherent in the types of property disputes
that are at the root of takings law—questions to which this Article now
turns.
III. TAKINGS LOCALISM
Contemporary takings jurisprudence—as Part I explained—privileges
the democratic resolution of conﬂicts between individual property rights
and community imperatives. Although many of these conﬂicts involve
local, not state, democracy, state legislatures—as Part II made clear—have
shaped and limited local authority across a range of policy domains at the
core of constitutional property.
This Part accordingly turns to how best to understand this broad state
reordering of local authority. To do so, this Part begins by situating
192. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 394.36 (2019).
193. See Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights “Trump?” An Examination of
Speech and Property, 52 Me. L. Rev. 311, 316–17 (2000) (explaining that many constitutional rights other than property—free speech, due process, free exercise, and the like—
can be considered public goods because consumption by one person generally does not
detract from consumption by others and no one can be easily prevented from enjoying it).
The claim that many constitutional rights other than property rights are appropriately
considered public goods is not without reservation. For example, to the extent hate speech
silences its targets, the government’s noninterference with one’s claim to free speech—for
instance, a newspaper’s desire to publish hate speech—does interfere with another’s claim
to the same. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127, 129–30 (1987).
194. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 75, 79–87 (2010)
(describing, through a series of hypotheticals, how advancing one property interest comes
at the expense of others).
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property rights statutes in the context of the increasingly contentious
landscape of contemporary conﬂicts over intergovernmental relations
within the states, where states are increasingly constraining local power in
almost every area of governance. Building on this connection, this Part
then argues that the values inherent in takings jurisprudence would be
best served by restoring an equilibrium between states and local
governments that would foster intersystemic dialogue and promote a more
contextual, nuanced approach to resolving the challenging tradeoffs
inherent in takings law’s balance between individual rights and
community imperatives.
A.

The Disequilibrium of the New Preemption

To begin, it is important to take a step back and situate the array of
state statutes restructuring local authority in the property rights arena in
the context of a rapidly changing landscape of contemporary state–local
relations. In particular, scholars and popular commentators have raised
concerns about the rise of a new form of state preemption that is increasingly polarized in its valence, targeted in its focus, far-reaching in its sweep,
and even outright punitive in its application.195
Local-government legal authority is determined by a variety of state
and federal doctrines that sound in constitutional structure, legislation,
and even individual rights.196 Traditionally, at least since the middle of the
nineteenth century, states were understood to exercise plenary authority
over local governments.197 But waves of home-rule reform since Missouri
195. See, e.g., Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response
to Local Policy Innovation, 47 Publius: J. Federalism 403, 407–08 (2017) (surveying
empirical trends in state preemption of “local fracking bans, minimum wage ordinances,
sanctuary city policies, LGBT rights ordinances, and the rising use of ‘blanket
preemption’”). Contemporary conﬂicts over state reordering of local authority have
generated a signiﬁcant body of literature in recent years. See supra note 17.
196. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 65, at 4, 111–12. Home rule generally refers
to the legal authority of local governments independent of speciﬁc state delegation. See
Briffault & Reynolds, supra note 191, at 349. By contrast, the regime of formal local legal
powerlessness is generally known as “Dillon’s Rule,” in reference to former Iowa Supreme
Court Justice and United States Circuit Judge John F. Dillon, who crystalized the conception
of local governments as creatures of the state and a corresponding jurisprudence that
requires speciﬁc legislative delegation, narrowly construed, for local governments to act. Id.
at 327–30.
197. The classic statement of this plenary-authority view can be found in Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, a case involving a challenge to the merger between the cities of Pittsburgh and
Allegheny. 207 U.S. 161, 165–67 (1907). There, the Supreme Court stated that
[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of
the State as may be entrusted to them . . . . The number, nature and
duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the
territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion
of the State . . . . The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or
withdraw all such powers, . . . expand or contract the territorial area, unite
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adopted the ﬁrst home-rule constitutional amendment in 1875
(empowering St. Louis to adopt the nation’s ﬁrst municipal home-rule
charter) have carved out important areas of local authority.198 State
oversight of local governance is also constrained by federal and state individual rights that impact the state–local relationship,199 as well as general
limitations on state legislation, such as state constitutional “single subject”
requirements and state constitutional bans on “special legislation.”200
Within this framework, states have long played a constructive role policing
particularly signiﬁcant interlocal conﬂicts and setting baseline rules for
policy areas of statewide concern.201

the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and
destroy the corporation. All this may be done . . . with or without the
consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.
Id. at 178–79.
198. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2257, 2277–322
(2003) (noting that participants in early home-rule reform movements thought that “to
treat cities as mere creatures of the state with no independent responsibility” would “not
suffice” and eventually carved out independent local powers).
199. For example, the Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot held that Black residents
of Alabama had validly asserted claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
challenging the state’s redistricting of the City of Tuskegee. 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960). In
the words of Justice Frankfurter, if the facts as alleged were true, the state redistricting
legislation was “solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing
Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.” Id. at
341. In this context, then, the individual rights of disenfranchised residents posed a
meaningful barrier to the supposedly plenary exercise of state authority over local
government boundaries. For a more recent example of an individual-rights constraint on
supposedly plenary state authority, the Supreme Court held that a state constitutional
amendment that prohibited policies to protect against discrimination on the basis of
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships” violated
the Equal Protection Clause. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635 (1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b (1992)).
200. See Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure:
Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38
Harv. J. on Legis. 103, 124–51, app. I at 165–66 (2001) (surveying state constitutional
legislative procedural constraints). Single-subject rules, as their name suggests, limit the
substance of legislation (and popular democracy through initiatives and referenda) to
related policy matters, so that legislators do not join disparate subjects for horse trading,
legislative brinksmanship, or the kind of transparency challenges that can arise when a topic
is hidden in a larger, unrelated bill. Bans on “special legislation” and “general laws”
requirements, by contrast, operate as a quasi-equal protection generality constraint,
imposing limitations on legislation that illegitimately singles out or irrationally impacts
limited categories, including local governments. See generally Anthony Schutz, State
Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural Restraints, 40 J. Legis. 39
(2013) (offering a structural, rather than an individual-rights, rationale to explain state
special-legislation provisions).
201. This Article returns, in section III.B, to the question of whether “property rights”
as such—beyond the baseline level of protection set by takings jurisprudence—should be
considered a valid statewide interest sufficient to displace local authority in areas such as
land use and the environment.
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In recent years, however, the balance between local decisionmaking
and state intervention has fallen into disequilibrium in many areas of
policy.202 States, for example, have barred or limited local employee-benefits
laws, such as minimum wage, fair scheduling, and paid sick leave;203 sought
to limit local immigration approaches often labeled as “sanctuary”;204
preempted local antidiscrimination protections;205 and taken aim at local
housing policies that seek to advance equity and integration, including
rent regulations and local source-of-income antidiscrimination ordinances.206
State preemption has been similarly widespread in traditional areas of
local concern, such as public health,207 as well as emerging areas of local
innovation, such as fracking,208 municipal broadband,209 and the sharing

202. These conﬂicts have been fueled by the ascendancy of coalitions of interest groups
in many state legislatures that are generally hostile to regulation and people working to
advance social-conservative policies, converging on a strain of anti-localism that bridges both
perspectives in opposition to the relatively more progressive regulatory leanings of cities.
See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 964.
203. Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 1999.
204. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, Anti-Sanctuary and
Immigration Localism, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 837, 839 (2019) (“[Texas’s anti-sanctuary law]
limits endorsement of sanctuary policies, cuts down on the discretion of local agencies to
disentangle themselves from federal enforcement, and creates civil and criminal liability for
officials who maintain certain types of noncooperation policies on aiding federal immigration
enforcement.”).
205. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 964–65 (describing how
North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee preempted local antidiscrimination laws,
including a local ordinance enacted to protect against LGBT discrimination); Schragger,
The Attack on American Cities, supra note 17, at 1178 n.81, 1183, 1223–25 (noting how
certain states, such as North Carolina and Colorado, sought to preempt local LGBTprotective antidiscrimination laws).
206. See Nat’l League of Cities, Homeward Bound: The Road to Affordable Housing 45, 59
app. B (2019), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/nlc-Homeward-Bound_TheRoad-to-Affordable-Housing_WEB-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7BN-E6D6] (“[V]arious state
preemption of local authority over land use and protected classes has created an uneven
and inequitable marketplace of housing across the country.”). Local rent-regulatory regimes
have generated takings cases, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), marking
yet another policy domain where states have overridden the authority that the Supreme
Court has validated for local governments in takings law, see infra section II.C.5.
207. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 966–67 (noting that in the
area of public health, various states have preempted local regulation in tobacco products,
e-cigarettes and other alternative tobacco products, and nutrition and food policies).
208. See Sarah Fox, Home Rule in an Era of Local Environmental Innovation, 44
Ecology L.Q. 575, 596 (2017) (contrasting the differing approaches of states like West
Virginia, Colorado, New York, and Pennsylvania with respect to implied preemption of local
limits on fracking).
209. See Nat’l League of Cities, City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State
Analysis 3–4, 17–19 (2018), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/NLC-SMLPreemption-Report-2017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD6R-QXR] (“State preemption of
municipal broadband generally falls into two categories: either explicitly prohibiting a
public entity from providing broadband, or . . . placing sufficient barriers before local
governments attempt to pursue municipal broadband.”).
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economy.210 And, crucially, this state reordering of local authority often
plucks at policy areas big and small without any analogous state regulatory
regime, leaving regulatory voids on issues pressing to local governments.211
State–local conﬂicts no longer reﬂect simply competing understandings about which speciﬁc policy questions are more readily addressed at
the state or local level. Instead, these conﬂicts are becoming weaponized
and increasingly partisan.212 Arizona, for example, now uses its power over
state revenue-share funding to force local governments to repeal local laws
that the state deems preempted, setting litigation barriers to deter local
governments from challenging such determinations.213 And states are now
seeking to penalize individual local officials—threatening to ﬁne and
remove them from office if they take actions in areas that the states
consider preempted. In 2003, Oklahoma enacted a law that created
individual civil liability for officials who vote for laws that conﬂict with the
state’s ﬁrearm preemption statute, a practice that has since proliferated.214
210. Id. at 3–4, 12–16 (examining how state legislatures have preempted local laws in
ride-hailing and home-sharing platforms).
211. The phenomenon of what one scholar has called “null preemption”—eliminating
authority without a corresponding higher-level regulatory regime to replace it—has not
traditionally been a feature of state preemption conﬂicts, though it has become a signiﬁcant
element of the new preemption. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1015 (2010) (describing null preemption and its lack of normative
justiﬁcations). Some of the new preemption involves state legislation that sweeps away areas
of local authority in their entirety. Michigan, for example, passed a statute that the press has
dubbed the “Death Star bill”—H.B. 4052, the Local Government Labor Regulatory
Limitation Act. See Emily Lawler, Gov. Rick Snyder Signs ‘Death Star’ Bill Prohibiting Local
Wage, Benefits Ordinances, MLive (June 30, 2015), https://www.mlive.com/lansingnews/2015/06/gov_rick_snyder_signs_death_st.html [https://perma.cc/A226-HNRE]. The
act preempted local governments from “adopting, enforcing or administering local laws or
policies concerning employee background checks, minimum wage, fringe beneﬁts, paid or
unpaid leave, work stoppages, fair scheduling, apprenticeships, or remedies for workplace
disputes”—essentially the entire range of employee protections in one sweeping bill.
Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 2000.
212. See Briffault, Challenge of New Preemption, supra note 17, at 1997 (“The rise of
the new preemption is closely connected to the interacting polarizations of Republican and
Democrat, conservative and liberal, and nonurban and urban.”); Scharff, supra note 17, at
1479 (stating that preemption battles often happen when interest groups lose a ﬁght on the
local level and use intrastate preemption as a weapon to oppose local policies they dislike);
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, supra note 17, at 1232 (“To be sure, the state–
city split reﬂects a Democratic/Republican split—and the fact that the ideological distance
between the parties is signiﬁcant and growing”).
213. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-194.01 (2020); see also State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson,
399 P.3d 663, 671–72 (Ariz. 2017) (upholding portions of the statute). For discussion of
Brnovich and its signiﬁcance, see Scharff, supra note 17, at 1510–15.
214. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.24(D) (2019) (“When a person’s rights pursuant to the
protection of the preemption provisions of this section have been violated, the person shall
have the right to bring a civil action against the persons, municipality, and political
subdivision jointly and severally for injunctive relief or monetary damages or both.”); see
also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3108 (I)–(K) (private right of action for personal sanctions
against local officials, including termination, removal, and civil penalties); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 45-9-53(5)(a), (c) (2020) (private right of action and creating civil liability for local elected
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And more than one state now even subjects local officials to potential
criminal penalties for testing the boundaries of preemption.215
This new targeted and punitive preemption, which reﬂects longstanding but growing anti-urban hostility in many states,216 has highlighted
contemporary democratic challenges at the state level. Most prominent
among them, as Professor Paul Diller has argued, are state legislative
gerrymandering efforts that have left the composition of many state
legislatures starkly unrepresentative of the actual partisan composition of
their states.217 But state preemptive legislation also reﬂects breakdowns in
our modern system of campaign ﬁnance, as well as the rise of interest
groups able to promulgate model legislation from state to state.218
Political-process failures occur at the local level, as well—if not
gerrymandering at the scale of the states, then certainly low participation,
local interest-group capture, and the like that provide reminders to avoid
overly valorizing local democracy.219 But in the contemporary landscape of
state–local relations, it is striking the extent to which assumptions about
the Madisonian argument for broader-scale politics is being tested.
Indeed, the “new preemption” has led to calls for reforming contemporary state–local legal relations to modernize home rule to better protect
local democracy from unreasonable state interference.220 The details of

officials up to $1,000, plus attorney’s fees and costs). State courts struck down similar
provisions of a Florida statute. See City of Weston v. DeSantis, No. 2018 CA 0699, 2019 WL
4806195, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2019) (striking down the punitive preemption
provisions, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.33(3)–(4) (2019), on grounds of legislative immunity, governmental function immunity, state contract clause, and state constitutional limitations on
removal); Marcus v. Scott, No. 2012-CA-001260, 2014 WL 3797314, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June
2, 2014) (holding Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.33(3)(e) unconstitutional).
215. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.870(4) (West 2020); S.B. 4, 85th Leg. § 5.02 (Tex. 2017).
216. See Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, supra note 17, at 1166 (“Even so,
one might be surprised that the old rural–urban political dynamic that characterized earlytwentieth-century hostility to cities has reasserted itself in the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst
century.”).
217. See Paul A. Diller, The Political Process of Preemption, 54 U. Rich. L. Rev. 343,
370–71 (2020) (explaining how gerrymandering in Michigan, for example, has led to “[t]he
skewing of the Michigan legislature away from statewide voter preferences”).
218. Id. at 362–63.
219. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 24, at 3–5 (listing some of the problems of local
government, such as a lack of representation, low participation in local elections, and interest
group capture).
220. The National League of Cities (NLC), an organization representing roughly 19,000
local governments, recently published a document with a new comprehensive approach to
home rule, including a model constitutional article that states could adopt in whole or in
part. See Richard Briffault, Nestor M. Davidson, Paul A. Diller, Sarah Fox, Laurie Reynolds,
Erin A. Scharff, Richard Schragger & Rick Su, Nat’l League of Cities, Principles of Home
Rule for the Twenty-First Century 8 (2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=3613&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/QMR9-LJDJ].
This recent publication returns NLC to a role that its predecessor, then known as the
American Municipal Association, played in the last major wave of home-rule reform.
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these proposed reform efforts are beyond the scope of this Article, but this
renewed interest in home rule is notable for what it indicates about the
salience of the current texture of state oversight. Regardless of the
prospects for reform, it is clear that state–local relations have reached an
inﬂection point.
In this light, it is possible to understand the broad, long-standing, and
ongoing project of state legislatures limiting local-government discretion
on property issues at the core of takings law as both a precursor to and an
example of new preemption. The overlap between the two phenomena is,
to be sure, not complete. State property rights legislation, for example,
resulted from a difficult-to-pinpoint combination of grassroots “property
rights” movements, organized interest-group advocacy, and reactions to
Supreme Court case law as too permissive. Much of the new preemption,
by contrast, has involved more directly partisan conﬂicts between
progressive cities and conservative state legislatures.221
At bottom, though, there is a notable substantive conﬂuence of longdeveloping takings-related state statutes and the sweeping state interference with local governance that is generating debate and consternation
today. Akin to the new preemption, state preemption of local authority on
land-use issues at the center of takings law approaches the resolution of
local conﬂicts in an overly rigid and unduly uniform manner, eliminating
even the possibility that local governments can serve as valuable partners
in responding to local conditions.
B.

Recalibrating State–Local Relations in Takings

Understanding that there are conceptual linkages—though not, of
course, perfect symmetry—between the new preemption and state takingsrelated legislation underscores what is problematic about the rigidity and
undue uniformity of that legislation. This section builds on these linkages
to argue not for a pro-localist approach to constitutional property per se
but instead for a rebalancing of the state–local relationship toward a more
nuanced, context-sensitive approach that resists the anti-localist bent of
contemporary state statutory law on issues most often at the center of
takings cases.
There is much to commend in the potential inherent in local
governance for the democratic decisionmaking that animates takings
jurisprudence. It is always difficult to generalize about local governments

Jefferson B. Fordham, Am. Mun. Ass’n, Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal
Home Rule 5 (1953).
221. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 963–64 (noting how
“[f]ollowing the 2010 census, many state legislative districts were redistricted in ways that
locked in partisan advantages”).
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given the tremendous variety in their form, size, and authority.222 Still,
some broad themes can fairly characterize what often distinguishes local
governments from their state counterparts, particularly in the context at
issue here. Local governments, for example, generally offer more
meaningful opportunities for civic participation,223 can often respond
more swiftly to pressing challenges,224 and hold the promise of innovation
and experimentation,225 all in the shadow of a special sensitivity to costs
given their comparatively limited ability to raise revenues.226 All of these
markings of local democracy bear relevance to the types of issues that most
often animate takings jurisprudence.
The ability of the citizenry to participate in the workings of democracy
in direct ways, to begin, can be stronger at the local level than at the state
level. Local officials often work and reside near their constituents,
naturally making them more accessible—particularly in those smaller
municipalities—than state legislators who regularly deliberate in the
conﬁnes of their state capitals.227 Civic engagement at the local level, Alexis
de Tocqueville argued, has the ancillary beneﬁt of putting democracy
“within people’s reach,” ultimately strengthening more centralized levels
of governance.228
A second core set of arguments for localism that resonates for
constitutional property centers on responsiveness and accountability. In
their best light, local communities consist not of arbitrarily arranged
individualists, but of groups of people who seek to develop and pursue
shared goals.229 Local governance allows for distinct localities to adopt
222. See, e.g., Scharff, supra note 17, at 1474–75 (noting that there are over 90,000 local
governments, with a mix of general-purpose governments—such as counties, municipalities,
and townships—and special purpose governments).
223. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 Urb. Law. 253,
258 (2004) [hereinafter Briffault, Home Rule] (“Democratic participation is more possible
at the local level, where government bodies and public officials are more accessible and
closer to home than they are at the state or national levels.”).
224. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local
Government Law, 31 Urb. Law. 257, 274–75 (1999) (describing how local government is
more responsive to “discrete communities” because minorities may be found in numbers
“disproportionate to their representation in the statewide population” at the local level).
225. See Barron, supra note 198, at 2337 (describing the degree of local discretion over
policy choices).
226. See, e.g., Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1680–85 (discussing the relative
cost sensitivity of local governments); see also Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments,
Dues, and the “Get What You Pay for” Model of Local Government, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 373, 392
(2004) (“[A] fairly large number of states have imposed stringent limits on
their local governments’ ability to raise revenue.”).
227. See Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking
Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 Temp. Pol. & C.R.L. Rev. 371, 373–74 (2008) (“It is
far more likely that average citizens may interact with their city councilmember or mayor
than their state legislator or governor.”).
228. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 62–63 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
229. Id. at 259.
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different policies and approaches to advancing the diverse range of these
goals via the provision of services and the promulgation of regulations.230
This informational advantage of localism is reinforced by the immediacy
of the ability of local governments to hold civic leadership accountable
when governance diverges from local preferences.
While by no means exhausting the valence of localism, a third
argument for devolution that resonates for constitutional property sounds
in the value of policy experimentalism. Justice Brandeis famously spoke to
the ability of a “single, courageous” state to serve as a “laboratory” to
conduct “novel social and economic experiments.”231 Justice Brandeis’s
logic naturally extends downward from the ﬁfty states to the nation’s 3,000
counties and 15,000 municipalities.232 These localities not only conduct
policy experiments but also serve as testing grounds for the results, with
the extent to which other localities import policies initiated elsewhere
substantiating the value of those experiments.233
Highlighting these traditionally beneﬁcial features of local
governance is not to deny the existence of long-avowed reasons for caution
in devolving decisionmaking responsibility over property issues at the
center of takings disputes. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison famously
depicted local governments as of insufficient size and capacity to engage
in the type of long-term democratic give-and-take necessary to reach
shifting majorities at more centralized levels of government.234 On this
view, there is special concern that a single interest group can transform
into a solidiﬁed majoritarian faction at the local level, wielding its power
to take what it pleases from opposing factions without needing to give

230. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 1413 (2006) (“Flowing from
the creation of more responsive governments are the related beneﬁts of . . . better
government reﬂecting constituents’ diverse social values . . . .”).
231. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
232. See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 259. But see Kenneth Stahl, Home
Rule and State Preemption of Local Land Use Control, Urb. Law. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3485872 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (suggesting that local policies rarely diverge in practice, at least with respect to basic
land-use controls).
233. See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 259. Local experimentalism can also
foster policy diffusion, generating grassroots movements that, however promising, might
have difficulty advancing at the state level. Id. at 260.
234. The Federalist No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also,
e.g., Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from
the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 74, 100 (1989)
(“Everyone is . . . tediously aware of the Federalist argument that we need a large republic
as a safeguard against faction.”); Michael J. Waggoner, Log-Rolling and Judicial Review, 52
U. Colo. L. Rev. 33, 35 (1980) (explaining the process of trading votes so that minorities
can become a majority on an issue).
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much of anything in return.235 A tyrannical local majority also may have a
propensity to generate external impacts, as the scale of local regulation
creates parochial incentives for the local political system to impose
externalities on other local governments.236
In one sense, these reasons for caution on local authority might seem
especially pertinent in the context of land-use regulation. Land is
immobile, and thus, real property ownership may be even more vulnerable
to expropriation than other interests held by persons in the minority
because owners cannot as readily exit the jurisdiction.237 Moreover, the
exercise of property interests in land—when compared to the exercise of
most other interests—is especially likely to generate extra-local effects
given land’s interconnectedness,238 particularly as the traditionally sharp
geographic separation among localities has given way to metropolitan
areas in which such separations are often undetectable.239
While a locality’s ability to regulate land use seems critical to its ability
to develop and police its character, such regulations present a magniﬁed
version of the same types of externality-generating impacts that the
exercise of property rights in land can portend. As Professor Briffault has
noted, “Local density controls, restrictions on lot size, restrictions on
affordable housing, and exclusions of regionally necessary (albeit locally
undesirable) facilities contribute to regional sprawl, traffic congestion,
housing costs, infrastructure costs, loss of open space, and other
environmental harms.”240 All of these concerns, explicitly or implicitly,
undergird support for state-level authority vis-à-vis local authority.
235. See generally Clint Bolick, Leviathan: The Growth of Local Government and the
Erosion of Liberty (2004) (arguing that the exponential growth of local government
threatens “grassroots tyranny”).
236. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity,
and Dynamism, 21 Va. Env’t L.J. 189, 223 (2002) (describing how local governments may
have their own “parochial concerns, such as impacts on the local tax base, jobs, and
economic development, as well as the local beneﬁts of certain environmental amenities”).
237. See, e.g., Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 2, at 58–62 (“[T]he
costs of eminent domain and regulatory takings mostly fall on immobile assets, and exit
therefore cannot be used to avoid most of them.”); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Competition
Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 854–67
(1992) (noting how even “vigorous competition [among municipalities] provides virtually
no protection against the municipal extraction of economic rents from landowners”). For
a defense of exit in the land context, arguing that “the market for development suffers many
frictions, but nevertheless may be sufficiently competitive to constrain local governments’
exactions practices, except in a few narrow circumstances,” see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 Colum. L. Rev. 473, 478 (1991).
238. See Sax, Private Property and Public Rights, supra note 41, at 155 (noting that “the
ecological facts of life demonstrate a powerful inextricability in the utilization of natural
resources”).
239. See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 262.
240. Id. at 261, 271; see also David A. Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 Sup. Ct.
Econ. Rev. 7, 7–8 (2009) [hereinafter Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain] (exploring the
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In another sense, however, traditional reasons for caution about local
authority in property lose some force when seen in light of counterbalancing concerns with state governance evident in the new preemption.
Barriers to democracy at the state level stemming from gerrymandering
and interest-group capture raise concerns in the property rights context
no less than in other areas of new preemption.241 Moreover, there is a
plausible argument that property-related interests at the local level are least
likely to be in need of extraordinary state intervention to overcome local
political-process failure. This is true whether they are overrepresented in
Professor William Fischel’s paradigmatically home-voting suburban
communities242 or because they represent the proverbial growth machines
of denser urban political economies.243 Whatever risks the tyranny of the
local majority holds as a general matter, in other words, property holders
seem more likely to be the subjects than the objects of political power in
most local contexts.244
The adoption of local regulations that affect property interests should
certainly reﬂect legitimate state concerns. States can play a meaningful

“phenomenon of ‘exclusionary eminent domain’—the exercise of eminent domain that has
the effect of excluding low-income households from an otherwise predominantly or entirely
middle-class or wealthy neighborhood or locality, whether or not exclusion itself was the
purpose of the condemnation”). Professor Briffault asserts that state mandates on some
subjects—such as policing business, promoting equality, or aiding the poor—“may at times
be necessary” where local governments would adopt them but for interlocal competition.
See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 223, at 268. Professor Richard Schragger suggests that
the prospect of exit to other jurisdictions is limited today in the face of the agglomeration
economies that characterize many cities. See Richard C. Schragger, Federalism,
Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 Va. L. Rev. 1537, 1548–53 (2019).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 217–218.
242. See generally Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 15 (arguing that the
political economy of suburban communities tends to be driven by interest groups focused
on preserving the value of single-family housing).
243. See Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy
of Place, 82 Am. J. Socio. 309, 309–10 (1976) (positing a theory that the desire for growth
mobilizes and builds consensus among the urban elite); see also Vicki Been, Josiah Madar
& Simon McDonnell, Urban Land Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth
Machine?, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 227, 259–61 (2014) (empirically testing the urbangrowth-machine and the homevoter models and ﬁnding “surprising support for the
homevoter-based model”).
244. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1,
41–44 (2008) (explaining the political economy of takings protection that favors owners
with relatively greater assets).

270

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:215

role guiding,245 brokering,246 monitoring,247 and, where appropriate,
intervening in local policies that have the greatest propensity to generate
externalities or discriminatory impacts beyond a locality’s boundaries.248 It
is difficult, however, to deny that state preemption in the property rights
context is all too often rigid and acontextual, rather than reﬂecting how
and in which situations the states might operate to improve the exercise of
local power.
For example, categorical state statutory compensation mandates249
bleach all local texture from an inquiry that in constitutional adjudication
recognizes challenging contextual tradeoffs among the degree of the
concentration of harm, the reasonableness of the expectation of an owner
in a given regulatory arena, and the nature of the governmental action at
issue. Similarly, bans on all economic-development eminent domain
valorize the worst potential breakdown of the exercise of local authority,
and, in the process, eliminate a potentially positive local policy option
regardless of the equities involved in any given instance.250
It is conceivable that procedural requirements could improve local
decisionmaking and protect vulnerable communities by clarifying the
terms of policy decisions that often have implications—in terms of discriminatory impacts, environmental degradation, and the like—beyond the
property at issue. But state procedural statutes in the takings context, such
as takings impact assessment requirements251 and state impact-fee

245. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Land Use Law and Active Living:
Opportunities for States to Assume a Leadership Role in Promoting and Incentivizing Local
Options, 5 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 317, 358–59 (2008) (discussing ways in which state
planning mandates can offer guidance to local governments).
246. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and
the New Regionalism, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 93, 97–98, 158 (2003) (discussing the state role in
facilitating regionalism); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal
Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 190, 221 (2001) (explaining state facilitation of interlocal
bargaining).
247. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use
Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. Rev. 177, 263 (2006) (discussing
state monitoring of, and data collection about, local policies).
248. See, e.g., Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, supra note 240, at 28–31
(discussing the need for state doctrine to temper exclusionary local policies).
249. See supra section II.A.1.
250. Many other instances of state preemption in the takings context similarly seem
designed to remove broad areas of local authority to respond to the perception of local
policy failure in particularly salient—even if not necessarily truly representative—examples.
The widespread adoption of rent-control preemption, for example, reﬂects not just the
political power of landlord interests at the state level, but also a lack of understanding of the
modern evolution of rent regulation as much more carefully crafted than early generations
of rent control. See generally Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Sophia House, Laboratories
of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46 Fordham Urb. L.J.
1041 (2019) (describing the numerous choices jurisdictions make in designing and
implementing modern-day rent regulation programs).
251. See supra section II.B.
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statutes,252 generally serve not to enhance the quality of local decisionmaking but instead to override it, thereby privileging the interests of
owners in contexts in which the local political economy seems unfavorable
to that interest group.253
A more intersystemically nuanced approach could involve states
helping local governments face the challenges of local governance—
managing interest-group pressures, increasing the capacity to understand
and weigh extra-local impacts, and the like, all of which are often
compounded by significant local fiscal constraints inherent in local
decisionmaking around property issues—without dismissing local
advantages in terms of civic participation, responsiveness, and experimentalism.254 The breadth of state efforts to limit local decisionmaking
authority in land-use and related policy areas simply do not allow for this
kind of contextualization, much like the bulk of recent new preemption
measures that pointedly eliminate local power.255 Local governments can
hardly be accountable—let alone responsive to distinctive local
conditions—if critical areas of authority are materially constrained or
removed in their entirety without justification.
This is not to cede entirely the state role by any means. States must
attend to particularly troubling local policies—for example, local
exclusionary zoning that reinforces economic and racial segregation. But
removing local authority wholesale through state preemption across a
range of local land-use and related policy areas is rarely the most prudent
course and may have unintended consequences.256 More targeted and
subject-speciﬁc state (and federal) intervention, whether through robust

252. See supra note 156 (noting, among many other examples, instances in which state
impact-fee statutes clarify the relevant standards and procedures at issue).
253. See Richard C. Schragger, Local Control of Land Use: A Partial Defense 3–8 (Sept.
2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Schragger, Local Control of Land
Use] (unpublished working paper) (arguing that recent state-level market-favoring preemption
of local land-use authority may harm lower-income and minority communities, while
deregulating local housing markets can lead to higher costs and less control over development
and displacement).
254. See Barron, supra note 198, at 2264 (advocating for home-rule reform that does
not “strictly limit local powers to a narrow sphere” but rather “alter[s] the current mix of
state law grants and limits that gives substance to local legal power”). See generally John R.
Nolon, Calming Troubled Waters: Local Solutions, 44 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (2019) (describing
examples of how states can provide critical information and support for local governments);
Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 177 (2018) (illustrating the
successes of cooperative “subfederalism” through Oregon, Florida, and California
regulations).
255. See supra section III.A.
256. See Schragger, Local Control of Land Use, supra note 253, at 3–6 (discussing state
deregulation of local land use as tending to favor market-oriented solutions to problems
such as affordable housing that may undermine the nominal goals of such deregulation but
arguing that state preemption of local authority is not a viable solution).
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fair housing laws or related approaches, are generally preferable to unduly
uniform state constraints.257
When seen in full, then, the contemporary landscape of broad, overly
rigid state takings preemption undermines the positive role that local
governance can play in constitutional property without many of the offsetting beneﬁts of a cooperative state–local approach. Ultimately, then, a
more localist-sensitive takings federalism—a takings localism—could
productively rebalance the state–local relationship away from an antilocalism that has for too long unduly problematized property governance.
C.

Localism and Takings Theory

Rebalancing state intervention to protect space for local authority and
input, with appropriate caution, lends normative strength to a jurisprudence of the Takings Clause that seeks to maintain property’s
character as a healthy democratic institution.258 A more localist-sensitive
equilibrium, however, also illuminates long-standing debates in academic
discourse. Although the richness of the literature on takings theory does
not allow for a full accounting here, it is sufficient to note critical ways in
which a new takings localism would resonate both for takings theories that
give primacy to efficiency and those more oriented toward fairness and
distributional justice.
Many efficiency-based theories of takings rest on the implicit premise
that human values and ends are generally subjective.259 On this view, the
legislative process serves to maximize the satisfaction of these subjective
values and ends, acting like a market where votes and political advantage
serve as currencies of exchange.260 Regulatory choices are understood in
turn as the product of bargains struck among diverse, individually derived
preferences, with majoritarianism theoretically lowering the transaction
costs of reaching that bargain.261 Constitutionally mandated
compensation, in this view, helps ensure that majorities take account of

257. Cf. Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 17, at 990–96 (exploring state
general welfare constraints on exclusionary local authority).
258. See supra section I.A.
259. See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 152 (1977)
[hereinafter Michelman, Political Markets] (describing a “strictly individualist and
subjectivist conception of human experience” that “serves as a foundation for modern
economic analysis”).
260. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction ch.3 (1991) (providing an overview of an economic theory of legislation).
261. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 100–03 (1962) (explaining how during
bargaining under simple majority requirements, “the individual in the majority will have
relatively little incentive to be overly stubborn . . . since [they] will realize that alternative
members . . . can be drawn from the minority”).
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the costs—not merely the perceived beneﬁts—of regulation, or that
regulation counteracts market or procedural failures.262
Understanding the intersection of localism and takings theory adds
depth to this public-choice perspective by elevating distinctions among
government entities of different sizes and strengths within the states.263 To
begin, there is a strong argument that, to the extent the incentive structure
of the so-called “ﬁscal illusion” theory has any grounding in actual
practice, it is at the local level.264 Local governments tend paradigmatically
to be more sensitive to compensation mandates given their scale and the
ﬁscal constraints under which they operate, and, if anything, may be too
cautious in exercising their regulatory authority in that light.265 If states are
making the relevant tradeoffs, and they are comparatively more indifferent
to cost, they are more apt to miscalculate the balance between individual
rights and community needs in any particular circumstance.266 As with
other individual rights, that may—depending on one’s perspective—be a
feature, not a bug, but the point emphasized here is that it is important to
recognize that broader scales of reference change the calculus.
Moreover, to the extent that efficiency-based theories of takings
highlight the advantages of mobility—exit and entrance—to maximize the
satisfaction of individual preferences, there is an argument that local
authority can leverage individual market signals, given that much mobility
takes place within, rather than among, the states.267 It is true that the
immobility of real property makes mobility-based arguments in takings
262. See Jack L. Knetsch & Thomas E. Borcherding, Expropriation of Private Property
and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U. Toronto L.J. 237, 239–42 (1979) (discussing
internalization by distinguishing between “value to the owner” and market value); Saul
Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 319–20 (1990)
(explaining aspects of takings law as managing the interests of majorities and more or less
politically protected minority factions). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985) (surveying market and political
failures).
263. Pioneers in this regard include Professors William Fischel and Christopher Serkin.
See generally Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 15 (contending that homeowners
have more inﬂuence on the efficiency of local governments than they do on state or federal
governments); Serkin, Local Property, supra note 15 (advocating a local approach to the
takings problem as opposed to a uniform statewide approach).
264. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1634.
265. See id. at 1666–67.
266. To the extent that an efficiency-oriented perspective on takings would suggest a
generally stronger compensation threat than current takings jurisprudence sets forth, that
could plausibly lend support for the ﬁrst category of state interventions described above that
involve liability expansions. See supra section II.A. But a focus on incentives and
internalization would still give reasons to be cautious about other categories of state
constraints, such as procedural impositions, speciﬁc limitations on local authority, and
property owner empowerments. See supra sections II.B–.D. All of these interventions more
directly eliminate the ability of local political process to internalize the costs and beneﬁts of
regulation.
267. Cf. Serkin, Local Property, supra note 15, at 886–91 (arguing that takings law
should be decided locally because of competition between local governments).
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more vulnerable than in some areas of governance,268 but that does not
mean the feedback loop of local preference shaping and accountability
fails entirely for property. The critical point is a marginal one. To the
extent that local governments respond to mobility-related incentives in
areas of policy most related to takings, centralizing through broad-scale
state preemption undermines that avenue of preference satisfaction. This
is not to endorse the perspective wholesale, but instead to highlight the
interplay between devolutionary arguments in the discourse of localism
and their potential implications for takings.
Questions of the balance of authority between states and local
governments are no less relevant to evaluating fairness and distributional
justice in takings. As noted, both the Supreme Court and commentators
have highlighted the role of compensation in restoring parity to owners
whose property has been undermined in a manner that would be unjust
absent that payment.269 This perspective foregrounds substantive outcomes
rather than market or procedural failures. While fairness theories in takings
diverge on their assessment of when owners should be considered
sufficiently singled out by a regulation to warrant compensation, they tend
to moderate compensation mandates through a recognition of the longrun reciprocity inherent in property.270
Fairness theories of takings are often justiﬁed by the proposition that
because property law involves the resolution of competing claims to
nonshareable resources, governmental decisions to allocate property
interests will always require that someone’s interest be sacriﬁced one way
or another.271 Even if a sacriﬁce is especially stark and unexpected for a
268. See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 2, at 57–58 (“The main
difficulty with such competitive federalism arguments is that they fail to take adequate
account of the immobility of property rights in land.”).
269. See, e.g., Mulvaney, Property-As-Society, supra note 106, at 941 (“[T]akings
adjudications should be concerned not with whether a state decision presses property into
public service but rather the extent to which it applies that pressure in a way that unfairly
and unjustly isolates and sacriﬁces an individual owner’s property interest.”); Sax, Private
Property and Public Rights, supra note 41, at 163–64 (contending that compensation may
be appropriate where an owner is prohibited from using land as long as the prohibited use
would not generate “conﬂict-creating spillover effects”); Joseph William Singer, Kormendy
Lecture: Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 601, 636 (2015) (“Regulatory
laws are valid without compensation, even if only a few owners are affected, as long as those
laws do not unfairly single out individual owners to bear ‘public’ burdens that individuals
should not have to bear in the absence of compensation.” (citing Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
270. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 41, at 742–46 (reconceptualizing “reciprocity of
advantage” and “diminution of value” to determine when compensation is required);
Peterson, supra note 41, at 60 (arguing that compensation is not required when the
government takes an owner’s property to prevent or punish action that the public would
consider wrongful); Singer, The Ownership Society, supra note 41, at 325–38
(distinguishing the “castle,” “investment,” and “citizenship” models of property to examine
“just obligations”).
271. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, A World of Distrust, 120 Colum. L. Rev. Forum 153, 156
(2020) (“Property law consists of state allocative choices made in the face of competing
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given individual in a given instance, the thinking goes, that sacriﬁce is
likely to be offset in the long run by living in a civilized society that subjects
owners, over time, to an interconnected system of both sacriﬁces in service
of other members of the community and advantages gained at those same
persons’ expense.272 From this, it follows that legislators tasked with
resolving competing property claims—allocating those sacriﬁces and
advantages—deserve deference when guided by other-regarding
principles in identifying, deﬁning, persuading, and taking actions toward
objectively deﬁned human values and ends through joint, reasoned
deliberation.273
Fairness-based accounts of takings law, as with efficiency, can be
illuminated through the lens of the state and local allocation of decisional
authority with respect to the sacriﬁces and advantages inherent in
property.274 Fairness-oriented theories of takings require contextualized
decisionmaking, given that the normative evaluation of singling out
involves a detailed look into whether and why parties should be considered
similarly situated. In this light, there is much to be concerned about when
a sole decisionmaker—the state government—is making those decisions
through rigid dictates that sweep broadly rather than resting those
decisions on contextualized justiﬁcations.
This is not to contend, of course, that fairness-based accounts should
necessarily embrace localism in all elements. Rather, it is to suggest that
attending to the character of the speciﬁc level of government that makes
the allocative decision at the center of a takings case could deepen the
analysis required to determine whether a speciﬁc regulation has isolated a
particular individual in such a way that only compensation can avert
manifest injustice. Adding localism to this analysis highlights the relative
capacity to target and respond to on-the-ground impacts, offer impacted
parties meaningful opportunities to participate, and confront fundamental
ills such as exclusion and inequality. As with the blunt tool of preemption
and similar state constraints in efficiency accounts, so too with fairnessbased theories there can be much to commend an equilibrium that
claims to access or exclude others from ﬁnite resources . . . .”); see also UnderkufflerFreund, A Special Right, supra note 189, at 1039 (asserting that protecting a property
interest for one person “necessarily and inevitably” denies that same interest to someone
else (emphasis omitted)).
272. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 109 (Cal. 2002)
(asserting that reciprocity of advantage lies “not in a precise balance of burdens and
beneﬁts . . . but in the interlocking system of beneﬁts . . . that all the participants in a
democratic society may expect to receive, each also being called upon from time to time to
sacriﬁce . . . for the common good”).
273. See Michelman, Political Markets, supra note 259, at 149–51 (describing the
legislature as a mechanism for organizing human action to achieve “public or objective
values”).
274. Cf. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us, supra note 15, at 1699 (“One does not need
to give in to localism bashing to acknowledge that local governments are very likely to deal
with property issues differently from the way that the federal government does . . . .”).
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preserves space for the local in an intersystemic dialogue that fosters
nuance and regard for the challenging tradeoffs inherent in constitutional
property.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with the premise that the Takings Clause provides
protection against changes to a legal right—property—that states have
traditionally deﬁned. This means that takings law is inherently federalist
in structure, placing great weight on the democratic process within the
states to resolve many of the most contentious constitutional property
questions. But takings federalism does not stop devolving at the state level,
given the centrality of local governments to property. Given that, it makes
sense—echoing Professor Heather Gerken—to carry the democratic
vision at the heart of takings jurisprudence all the way down.275
Takings jurisprudence provides space for democratic institutions,
from the councils of the smallest rural villages to the legislatures of the
most populous states. State legislatures, however, have unjustiﬁably
arrogated and centralized authority over property issues in a marked way
by preempting and otherwise constricting local powers to resolve issues
that have served as key touchpoints in the development of takings law. The
extent of this state interference when laid out in a cumulative way has been
underappreciated in the literature and raises signiﬁcant concerns.
Resolving takings conﬂicts through overly rigid, unmediated
statewide standards echoes the arguments that scholars have made against
the current state excesses of the new preemption. Strengthening local
authority in the property arena certainly carries normative and practical
concerns—albeit concerns that may be better resolved through narrowly
targeted interventions rather than sweeping constraints on local authority.
But rebalancing to preserve local authority over property is true to the
democratic underpinnings of takings jurisprudence and is a more
attractive way of instantiating the decentralizing instincts underlying the
doctrine. States have a role to play, as do the courts, in setting the outer
boundaries of constitutional property. But local governments should not
lightly be discarded as a locus for contributing meaningfully to the
democratic tradeoffs inherent in conﬂicts over property. The time has
arrived, in short, for takings localism.

275. See Heather K. Gerken, Forward: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev.
4, 7–8 (2010) (“I use the term ‘federalism-all-the-way-down’ to describe the institutional
arrangements that our constitutional account too often misses—where minorities rule
without sovereignty.”).

